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I. INTRODUCTION
As a matter of statutory interpretation, it is unclear whether crimi-
nal defendants who obstruct federal sex-trafficking prosecutions must
register as sexual deviants on the national sex offender registry when
the defendants do not directly engage in sex trafficking. This un-
resolved legal question presents a tangled web of statutory construc-
tion. At best, the anomaly results from a congressional drafting
oversight in the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act
(SORNA).1 At worst, requiring defendants to register as sex offenders
where they have solely engaged in obstruction may reflect a legislative
and prosecutorial overzealousness emblematic of the War on Crime
and the War on Drugs,2 which have made the United States the most
carceral nation in history3 and which may undermine the very pur-
1. Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 16901–16929 (2012).
2. See generally, e.g., David Cole, Formalism, Realism, and the War on Drugs, 35
SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 241–55 (2001) (discussing the history, purpose, and implica-
tions of the War on Drugs).
3. In the last thirty years, U.S. prison populations rose from 300,000 to 2.3 million,
which some have argued was in response to civil-rights demands in housing, edu-
cation, and employment. MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCAR-
CERATION IN THE AGE OF COLORBLINDNESS 11 (2010); BRYAN STEVENSON, JUST
MERCY: A STORY OF JUSTICE AND REDEMPTION 15 (Spiegel & Grau 2015). Counting
individuals who are on probation or parole, more than 7 million men and women
are under legal supervision—numbers equal to the population of Israel. J. M.
Balkin & Sanford Levinson, Law as Performance, in 2 LAW AND LITERATURE: CUR-
RENT LEGAL ISSUES 279 (Michael Freeman & Andrew D.E. Lewis eds., Oxford
Univ. Press 1999). It should also be noted that, unlike the cases involving
Michael Brown, Tamir Rice, and Eric Garner—to name a few—prosecutors had
no problems obtaining indictments and convictions against the black bodies that
comprise the mass incarceration that has transpired since the 1970s. Cf. Lauren
Gambino, Eric Garner: Grand Jury Declines to Indict NYPD Officer over
Chokehold Death, GUARDIAN, Dec. 3, 2014, https://www.theguardian.com/us-
news/2014/dec/03/eric-garner-grand-jury-declines-indict-nypd-chokehold-death
[https://perma.unl.edu/5FHY-A2P6]; Ashley Fantz et al., Tamir Rice Shooting:
No Charges for Officers, CNN (Dec. 28, 2015), http://www.cnn.com/2015/12/28/us/
tamir-rice-shooting [https://perma.unl.edu/NPS9-2MV9]; Eyder Peralta & Bill
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poses of SORNA. The overuse and abuse of SORNA, embodied in man-
dating obstructionist registration, unmoors SORNA from its
legitimate concerns, purposes, and justifications. No court has ad-
dressed the issue. Ultimately, congressional intervention is funda-
mentally necessary to address the anomaly of obstructionist sex-
offender registration.
The crux of the problem lies at the intersection of SORNA and the
federal sex-trafficking statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1591.4 In its plain lan-
guage, SORNA mandated sex-offender registration for anyone who vi-
olates § 1591.5 Section 1591, however, has two prohibitions: (1) a sex-
trafficking provision under § 1591(a) and (2) its own obstruction provi-
sion under § 1591(d).6 Consequently, SORNA’s plain language man-
dates that a defendant who is guilty of obstructing a federal sex-
trafficking prosecution but has not engaged in actual sex trafficking or
even a sexual offense must register as a sex offender under the na-
tional sex offender registry.
The legislative history of SORNA further complicates the anomaly
of obstructionist registration. In 2006, when Congress enacted
SORNA and when SORNA mandated registration for a § 1591 convic-
tion, § 1591 only encompassed sex trafficking. In 2008, Congress ex-
panded the scope of criminal liability under § 1591 beyond sex
trafficking to include obstruction by enacting § 1591(d). Congress,
however, has never amended SORNA to clarify whether registration is
mandated when a defendant merely engages in obstructive conduct.
This uncertainty can be resolved by two possible arguments. On the
one hand, Congress may have been aware of SORNA’s registration re-
quirement when it enacted § 1591(d); therefore, Congress might have
intended in the statute’s plain language to mandate obstructionist re-
Chappell, Ferguson Jury: No Charges for Officer in Michael Brown’s Death, NPR
(Nov. 24, 2014), http://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2014/11/24/366370100/
grand-jury-reaches-decision-in-michael-brown-case.
4. 18 U.S.C. § 1591 (2012).
5. 42 U.S.C. § 16901 (2012).
6. The Department of Justice (DOJ) keeps statistical information about the number
of individuals charged with a § 1591 violation. Offices of the U.S. Attorneys, Ob-
scenity, Sexual Exploitation, Sexual Abuse, and Related Offenses, U.S. DEP’T
JUST., https://www.justice.gov/usam/usam-9-75000-obscenity-sexual-exploitation-
sexual-abuse-and-related-offenses#9-75.001 [https://perma.unl.edu/S2F6-MYHZ]
(last updated Nov. 2000). The DOJ does not, however, quantitatively capture the
number of “obstruction” prosecutions under § 1591(d) alone. Thus, it cannot be
determined how many individuals, including victims of sex trafficking, have been
charged with a § 1591(d) violation and subjected to the mandatory sexual registry
scheme. As of the time of writing, no court has decided the issue. As a result, it is
impossible to point to exact numbers about how many prosecutors are threaten-
ing defendants charged with § 1591(d) violations. Nevertheless, the problem of
statutory interpretation remains, and prosecutors, defendants, defense attor-
neys, judges, probation officers, and legislators must make themselves aware of
this lurking problem.
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gistration. Put differently, when Congress enacted § 1591(d), it might
have been fully aware of SORNA’s registration requirements and de-
liberately failed to amend SORNA because it intended to subject pure
obstructionists to registration. On the other hand, because SORNA’s
mandatory registration under § 1591 originally applied to criminals
actively engaged in sex trafficking only, Congress may have inadver-
tently overlooked the penal consequences of enacting § 1591(d) uncon-
ditionally into SORNA. This provision, which did not exist when
Congress required mandatory registration for § 1591(a) sex-traffick-
ing violators, is now included in the mandatory-registration require-
ments. Therefore, regardless of the possible due process and
overlapping-enactment issues, the plain language of SORNA man-
dates obstructionist registration. If plain language prevails, registra-
tion is mandatory and not discretionary at sentencing.
Requiring obstructionist registration, however, creates an absurd-
ity. Such penalty undermines the basic purposes of the sex offender
registry, specifically the desire to protect the community from the
compulsive nature of certain sexual offenders, reducing recidivism,
and subjecting defendants guilty of offensive sexual conduct to public
shaming.7 Mandating that pure obstructionists register as sex offend-
ers is a dire consequence for defendants who have not engaged in any
sexually offensive behavior, let alone trafficking, and yet must nation-
ally identify as sexual offenders. Moreover, irrational consequences
flow from mandating obstructionist registration. Abuses of
prosecutorial discretion are a primary example of such irrationality.8
Such registration can empower an overzealous prosecutor to threaten
certain sex-trafficking victims with sex registration when they ob-
struct prosecutions by refusing to testify against their traffickers or
“pimps.”9 In other words, mandating obstructionist registration can
create an occurrence where a sex-trafficking victim refuses to testify
7. Abril R. Bedarf, Comment, Examining Sex Offender Community Notification
Laws, 83 CAL. L. REV. 855, 899 (1995) (“[T]he main purpose of registration laws is
to provide police with information for use in subsequent investigations of sex
offenses.”).
8. Rebecca Krauss, Note, The Theory of Prosecutorial Discretion in Federal Law:
Origins and Developments, 6 SETON HALL CIR. REV. 1, 12 (“In criminal procedure,
the Court has not developed comparable safeguards against abuse by federal
prosecutors.” (citing Rachel E. Barkow, Separation of Powers in Criminal Law, 58
STAN. L. REV. 989, 991–93 (2006))).
9. “Pimp” is defined as “an adult who negotiates sexual encounters between the
prostituted person and a buyer.” Cheryl Nelson Butler, Bridge Over Troubled
Water: Safe Harbor Laws for Sexually Exploited Minors, 93 N.C. L. REV. 1281,
1292 n.55 (2015) [hereinafter Butler, Bridge Over Troubled Water] (citing Megan
Annitto, Consent, Coercion, and Compassion: Emerging Responses to the Com-
mercial Sexual Exploitation of Minors, 30 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 1, 13 (2011)); see
also H. Mitchell Caldwell, The Prosecutor Prince: Misconduct, Accountability, and
a Modest Proposal, 63 CATH. U. L. REV. 51, 80–81 (2014) (demonstrating the is-
sues surrounding prosecutorial abuse in America with the prosecution of Senator
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or release information about sex trafficking, is subsequently charged
and convicted of obstruction, and then has to register on a national
registry of sex offenders. This result may ultimately undermine the
integrity of both the federal sex-trafficking statute and SORNA by
subjecting each to scathing criticisms, which are laced with gender
bias, both explicit and implicit, for overreaching and misuse.
Moreover, mandating registration for sex-trafficking victims who
fail to cooperate in sex-trafficking investigations or prosecutions con-
travenes the legislative history of § 1591(d)’s obstruction provision.
Section 1591(d) clearly reflects Congress’s preoccupation with protect-
ing sex-trafficking victims from retaliation from their pimps and traf-
fickers when victims cooperate in sex-trafficking prosecutions.
Therefore, it is unlikely that Congress intended to arm prosecutors
with the potential weaponry of sex-offender registration to coerce sex-
trafficking victims into cooperating in prosecutions, thereby forcing
victims to trade their sex traffickers for new pimps—the prosecutors
themselves.
This Article argues that SORNA’s plain language as it applies to
§ 1591 creates, at best, a congressional oversight or, at worst, an irra-
tional overzealousness. In order to protect the integrity of both
SORNA and the federal sex-trafficking statute, and to adhere to the
canons of statutory construction, pure obstructionists should not be
compelled to register as sex offenders. Although facially SORNA’s
plain language may dictate a mandatory registration scheme for pure
obstructionists, this result contravenes a basic premise of statutory
construction—that is, the precept that requires courts to read an am-
biguous statute as a whole within its full structural context. The full
context of both SORNA and § 1591 mitigates against obstructionist
registration. Courts may well reject mandating registration for pure
obstructionists after finding ambiguity in SORNA and therefore re-
fuse to impose registration at sentencing. As another interim solution,
however, and until Congress intervenes, the sentencing court is in a
privileged position to weigh the evidence, which is often nuanced, in
order to make case-by-case determinations about whether an obstruc-
tionist has engaged in a sexual offense within the meaning of SORNA.
In keeping with the United States v. Booker10 trend, bestowing
Ted Stevens, a case where federal prosecutors failed to provide Sen. Stevens’s
defense team with exculpatory evidence, leading to their suspension).
10. 543 U.S. 220 (2005). As explained infra section IV.A, SORNA’s obstructionist re-
gistration is mandatory and extends to the plain language of the statute; how-
ever, a court may find persuasive other rules of statutory construction, thereby
seizing upon an ambiguity in the statute to exercise discretion. In Booker, the
Supreme Court held that the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines were no longer
mandatory, but discretionary. Booker, 543 U.S. at 249–58. See generally William
H. Danne, Jr., Annotation, Comment Note: Construction and Application of
United States Supreme Court Holding of U.S. v. Booker, 542 U.S. 220, 125 S. Ct.
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greater sentencing discretion on the courts, sentencing courts can sift
through often nuanced evidence and determine whether obstruction-
ists have actually engaged in conduct worthy of sex-offender registra-
tion as a penalty or protection for the community. Furthermore,
prosecutors who want to penalize obstructionists with registration
should consider charging them with conspiracy. The Racketeer Influ-
enced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) provides another alter-
native in which the evidence supports the charges.11 Ultimately, the
doctrinal anomaly SORNA creates for pure obstructionists under
§ 1591(d) demands legislative intervention by amending SORNA to
make clear that defendants who engage only in obstruction are not
required to register.
At its core, this problem encompasses numerous questions about
the meaning of a “sexual offense” under SORNA, the purpose of the
sex offender registry, whether sex-trafficking obstructionists are sex
offenders, whether sex-trafficking obstructions fit within the rationale
behind the registry, and whether refusing to testify in a sex-traffick-
ing prosecution or to cooperate in an investigation furthers the sex
trafficking—in other words, whether complicity furthers the trade in
human beings. This Article contributes to the existing field of sex-traf-
ficking scholarship by addressing this novel question in its statutory
and doctrinal context, and providing much-needed guidance for courts
and practitioners alike. In order to deconstruct the complexities of cul-
pability necessitating obstructionist registration, Part II introduces a
case study based on United States v. Farah.12 The case study presents
a close case for registration where it may be argued that a pure ob-
structionist’s complicity in a sex-trafficking conspiracy may further
the goals of sex trafficking and may therefore warrant registration.
Although a defendant may not engage in a sexual offense, obstruction-
ist conduct enables the conspiracy to persist and perhaps remain un-
detected for purposes of prosecution; thus, sentencing judges may well
be in a privileged position to sift through the nuances of evidence in
order to determine the appropriateness of registration on a case-by-
case basis. Part III establishes the groundwork and historical context
738, 160 L. Ed. 2d 621 (2005), Rendering U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Advisory, 10
A.L.R. Fed. 2d 1 (2006) (providing a collection and discussion of Booker and its
federal offspring). Although Booker applies to the sentencing guidelines and not
to statutorily mandated sentences, Booker’s reasoning and its progeny may be
used to support courts who find obstructionist registration objectionable and con-
gressionally unintended.
11. Section 901(a) of the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970 enacted RICO. Pub. L.
No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 922 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961–68 (2006)).
RICO criminalizes organized crime—for example, racketeering by an ongoing
criminal enterprise. 18 U.S.C. § 1962 (2006). Such activity may be construed to
include activities such as human trafficking, illegal gambling, or drug
distribution.
12. 766 F.3d 599 (6th Cir. 2014).
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for the federalization of sex trafficking. Part IV argues that obstruc-
tionist registration offends the canons of statutory interpretation, par-
ticularly the statutory schemes, legislative histories, and
congressional purposes of the federal sex-trafficking and registration
statutes. Part V provides a doctrinal framework for probing the anom-
aly SORNA has created in obstructionist registration. Specifically, it
addresses the concern that requiring obstructionists to register na-
tionally as sexual deviants in instances where they have only engaged
in obstruction reflects antiquated notions about criminal culpability in
concerted illegal activity, keeping true to the phrase “in for a penny, in
for a pound.” Moreover, abuses of prosecutorial discretion when charg-
ing defendants reflects the overzealous, unrestrained, and irrational
impetus that has made the United States the most carceral nation in
history.13 Part VI argues that in the absence of legislative history,
clear congressional language, case opinion, or other guidance, judges
should determine on a case-by-case basis whether individuals con-
victed of obstruction should have to register as sex offenders. Such an
approach would allow skilled adjudicators to weigh the evidence and
determine whether registry is warranted, discuss the potential reper-
cussions for defendants convicted under § 1591(d), and analyze
whether a factual scenario exists in which a defendant convicted of
obstruction should be required to register as a sex offender. Part VI
also offers prosecutors a cautionary warning to first charge their ob-
structionists with either conspiracy or a Racketeer Influenced and
Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) violation, or both, to ensure that
obstructionists have the same exposure for registration as traffickers.
Doing so provides prosecutors a distinct advantage during plea negoti-
ations.14 Equally important, defense attorneys must be aware of this
anomaly and bargain for clear language, supporting facts, and dismis-
sal of charges in plea agreements negating the prospect of obstruction-
ist registration. Defense attorneys must also carefully weigh the
prospect of obstructionist registration should they proceed to trial and
suffer conviction.
13. ALEXANDER, supra note 3, and accompanying text.
14. Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 922 (1970).
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II. CASE SYNOPSIS15
Thirty members of the Somali Outlaws and Somali Mafia,16 two
street gangs, operated a large-scale sex-trafficking ring spanning nine
cities in four states over ten years, from January 2000 until July
2010.17 Allegedly, at least one of the victims was only twelve years
old.18 With few exceptions, the vast majority of the sex-trafficking vic-
tims were from Somalia.19
Before the case proceeded to trial, Abdullahi Farah (Grey Goose), a
member of the Somali Outlaws, struck a deal with federal prosecutors
and agreed to cooperate with the investigation and prosecution of the
15. The following case synopsis is based on United States v. Farah, 766 F.3d 599 (6th
Cir. 2014). For organizational purposes, this section will be referred to infra as
“Case Synopsis.” Obstructionist registration presents several difficult questions,
not the least of which is whether complicity furthers sex trafficking, and thus,
whether registration is warranted. Complicity encompasses the defendant who
has not engaged in sex trafficking, but has instead refused to cooperate in a sex-
trafficking investigation or prosecution. The easier case involves denouncing
prosecutors who might threaten sex-trafficking victims with registration in order
to coerce cooperation and testimony. The latter may garner unequivocal
disapproval, whereas a case involving complicity only may present an analysis
that is more difficult and bodes toward registration. The following case study is
presented in order to explore and highlight the more difficult case analysis.
16. To be clear, the use of “Somali Outlaws” or “Somali Mafia” is not done to give
shape or rise to any discriminatory animus; rather, the terms reference what the
members called themselves. Allie Shah, 3 Twin Cities Somalis Guilty of Sex Traf-
ficking, STAR TRIB., May 5, 2012, at 1B.
17. Third Superseding Indictment at 4–5, United States v. Adan, 2012 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 27497 (M.D. Tenn. Mar. 1, 2012), No. 3:10-CR-00260.
18. Shah, supra note 16. In the context of sex-trafficking discourse, the use of the
word “victim” remains a contested issue. Several activists and advocates argue
that the term is much too essentialist and reductionist because the term reduces
human beings subjected to a form of torture to victimhood by implying a lack of
agency. Some critics argue that media reports and imagery of trafficked individu-
als reinforce stereotypes, particularly of trafficking victims from developing coun-
tries, by painting them as easily manipulated and passive. See BARBARA ANN
BARNETT, SEX TRAFFICKING IN MASS MEDIA: GENDER, POWER, AND PERSONAL
ECONOMIES (2014), http://www.unesco.org/new/fileadmin/MULTIMEDIA/HQ/CI/
CI/pdf/publications/gamag_research_agenda_annbarnet.pdf [https://perma.unl.
edu/U226-UCF7]; see also Michelle M. Lazar, Politicizing Gender in Discourse:
Feminist Critical Discourse Analysis as Political Perspective and Praxis, in FEMI-
NIST CRITICAL DISCOURSE ANALYSIS: GENDER, POWER, AND IDEOLOGY IN DISCOURSE
16 (2003) (arguing that it is an exercise in essentialism to present women as vic-
tims because doing so assumes that all women are relatively the same, which
thus ignores the individual needs and conditions of nonwhite, non-Western, and
economically disadvantaged women worldwide). While it is true that the use of
the term remains contested, this piece deliberately posits the term “victim” for
the sake of clarity and consistency in the field of sex-trafficking scholarship. In
addition, this piece reclaims the term, but also acknowledges that victims of sex
trafficking have been subject to torture; however, the term, as used in this piece,
does not eliminate their agency, resilience, and ability to thrive.
19. See Shah, supra note 16.
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sex-trafficking ring in exchange for immunity from prosecution.20 As
part of his cooperation, Farah identified fellow Somali Outlaws ac-
cused of sex trafficking, provided information about the location of
these defendants, and testified before the grand jury.21 After receiving
the benefit of his bargain, Farah claimed Somali Outlaws and Somali
Mafia members assaulted him and threatened his family. Conse-
quently, he refused to continue assisting the government in its ongo-
ing prosecution.22 In response, police arrested Farah and detained
him as a material witness.23 At a hearing regarding his refusal to con-
tinue cooperating with the federal prosecution, Farah told the presid-
ing judge that he not only refused to testify in the sex-trafficking trial,
but that he would not provide any other assistance to the govern-
ment.24 He claimed that law enforcement had coerced and pressured
him to testify, and that testifying jeopardized his safety.25 He failed,
however, to notify the court of any prior assaults on him or his
family.26
After steadfast refusals to testify,27 four months in prison for con-
tempt,28 and a jury trial addressing his obstructionist conduct, a jury
convicted Farah of three counts: (1) willfully misbehaving in the pres-
ence of the district judge in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 401(1); (2) dis-
obeying and resisting an order to testify in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 401(3); and, most importantly for purposes of this Article, (3) inter-
fering with the enforcement of a child sex trafficking law in violation
of 18 U.S.C. § 1591(d).29 The district court sentenced Farah to fifteen
months in prison for the second and third charges regarding his re-
fusal to comply with an order to testify and obstruction of the enforce-
ment of § 1591(d).30 On Farah’s appeal, the Sixth Circuit refused to
overturn Farah’s § 1591(d) conviction, stating that he “was fully
aware that he was a material witness and the Government’s ability to
establish its conspiracy . . . was dependent on his cooperation.”31 At
20. United States v. Farah, 643 F. App’x 480, 481 (6th Cir. 2016). Transactional im-
munity is the broadest form of prosecutorial immunity. When an individual is
granted transactional immunity, he or she cannot be prosecuted for the transac-
tion being investigated. See F. Clinton Broden, Fifth Amendment Right Against
Self Incrimination, CRIM. L. NEWSL. (Am. Ass’n for Justice, D.C.), Mar. 2, 2017,
https://www.justice.org/sections/newsletters/articles/fifth-amendment-right-
against-self-incrimination.
21. United States v. Farah, 766 F.3d 599, 599 (6th Cir. 2014).
22. Id. at 602.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 603.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 605.
29. Id.; see 18 U.S.C. § 401(1), (3) (2002); 18 U.S.C. § 1591(d) (2012).
30. Farah, 766 F.3d at 606.
31. Id. at 614.
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sentencing, the government did not raise the issue of whether the ob-
struction charge under § 1591(d) required Farah to register as a sex
offender, particularly when the government had not submitted any ev-
idence or even accused Farah of engaging in sex trafficking. Conse-
quently, neither the sentencing judge nor the Sixth Circuit has
addressed the issue.32
III. THE FEDERALIZATION OF HUMAN SEX TRAFFICKING
Where there is labor exploitation, there will be sexual exploita-
tion.33 Where the means for creating vulnerability for purposes of la-
bor exploitation exist, some will capitalize on the seemingly insatiable
appetite for vulnerable human flesh and exploit sexually. Trafficking
in human flesh for purposes of both labor and sex is “the third largest
source of income for organized crime (exceeded only by arms and
drugs trafficking), and is the fastest growing form of international
32. The preceding case study presents two radically different forms of obstruction
and their concomitant circumstances. The first involves Farah, a gang member
who refuses to testify against his fellow gang members. The second, hypotheti-
cally for purposes of analysis in this Article, involves actual sex trafficking vic-
tims who may refuse to testify against their pimps and traffickers. As will be
argued infra, Congress must intervene in order to clarify that obstructionists are
not subject to the mandatory registration regime. See § 1591(d). In the interim,
sentencing courts are in a privileged position to determine the subtleties and nu-
ances of evidence, particularly in conspiracy schemes. See generally United
States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 243 (2005) (explaining that the judicial branch
has power to interpret and use the Federal Rules of Evidence as a necessary com-
ponent of its decision-making power). It may be, for example, and as argued infra,
that the Government can submit proof during the sentencing hearing that Farah
received benefits from the sex-trafficking enterprise of his gang members, like
access to illicit substances, including drugs made possible through the gang’s sex-
trafficking activity, access to the sex-trafficking victims themselves, or enhanced
social cachet because Farah was associated with an enterprise that had access to
and trafficked in flesh. Although this Article ultimately argues that obstruction-
ist registration is inharmonious with the statutory scheme of SORNA, the legisla-
tive histories of the federal sex-trafficking and registration statutes and the
general principles of law applicable to the circumstances of the statutes as an
interim measure demonstrate that the sentencing courts should determine
whether obstructionist registration is mandated after a full vetting and weighing
of all evidence presented during the sentencing hearing. This Article’s case study
presents two forms of obstruction that highlight the nuanced difficulties in decid-
ing the appropriateness of obstruction registration.
33. For example, “A recent study found that more than thirty percent of unautho-
rized migrant laborers in San Diego County were victims of trafficking violations,
most inflicted by employers at the workplace—not smugglers.” Human Traffick-
ing and Sexual Exploitation: The Statistics Behind the Stories, WORLD WITHOUT
EXPLOITATION [hereinafter Behind the Stories], https://www.worldwithoutex-
ploitation.org/stats [https://perma.unl.edu/CJF8-SWB7]. Moreover, “965 cases of
human trafficking were reported to state law enforcement agencies in 2015. Of
these cases, 77% involved commercial sex trafficking and 22% involved labor traf-
ficking.” Id.
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crime.”34 As of 2012, the International Labor Organization (ILO)
states that 4.5 million people worldwide who have been victims of
human trafficking and forced labor are also victims of sex traffick-
ing.35 The ILO also claims that internationally, women and children
constitute fifty-five percent of the forced-labor trade.36 In 2015, one
study estimated fourteen to be the average age of entry for girls in the
sex trade.37 In another study, the average age of first exploitation was
eleven or younger.38 With regard to trafficking across international
borders, women and minors constitute seventy percent of trafficking
victims.39 Domestically, an estimated 200,000 to 300,000 minors are
commercially traded for sex in the United States each year.40
As early as the late 1980s, the sheer enormity of human traffick-
ing, recently branded as “modern slavery,” reached the congressional
radar.41 Since the late 1990s, Congress has been actively legislating to
34. GLOB. INITIATIVE TO FIGHT HUMAN TRAFFICKING, HUMAN TRAFFICKING—QUES-
TIONS & ANSWERS, https://www.unglobalcompact.org/docs/issues_doc/labour/
Forced_labour/HUMAN_TRAFFICKING_-_BACKGROUND_BRIEFING_NOTE
_-_final.pdf [https://perma.unl.edu/3QU8-U6RJ]. Human trafficking affects coun-
tries all over the world. While this Article will only address law in the United
States, the fact remains that trafficking exists on a global level and is an econom-
ically beneficial enterprise. Id.
35. New ILO Global Estimate of Forced Labour: 20.9 Million Victims, INT’L LABOUR
ORG. (June 1, 2012), http://www.ilo.org/global/topics/forced-labour/news/WCMS
_182109/lang—en/index.htm [https://perma.unl.edu/BBX9-QRCL].
36. Id. Methodology and the spread of moral panic are two of a number of reasons
why claims surrounding the prevalence of sex trafficking are vexed, troubling,
and contested. This Article is more interested in exploitation panic. Studies are
not generalizable. It also bears noting that the empirical information and statis-
tics cited here are not to incentivize a “moral panic”; rather, they are used to
insight exploitation panic. Put differently, this Article aims to set the scale and
stage for our society’s insatiable appetite for vulnerable human flesh. Such crav-
ings are historical and consistent, tracing their genesis to the slave trade.
37. Behind the Stories, supra note 33 (citing AMI CARPENTER & JAMIE GATES, THE
NATURE AND EXTENT OF GANG INVOLVEMENT IN SEX TRAFFICKING IN SAN DIEGO
COUNTY (2016), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/249857.pdf [https://
perma.unl.edu/AU95-WKW5]).
38. Id. (citing FRANCES GRAGG ET AL., NEW YORK PREVALENCE STUDY OF COMMER-
CIALLY SEXUALLY EXPLOITED CHILDREN (2007), http://www.ocfs.state.ny.us/main/
reports/csec-2007.pdf [https://perma.unl.edu/Y4T8-XXZF]).
39. New ILO Global Estimate of Forced Labour, supra note 35.
40. S. Res. 340, 113th Cong. (2014); S. 1518, 113th Cong. (2013); Butler, Bridge Over
Troubled Water, supra note 9 (citing INST. OF MED. & NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL,
CONFRONTING COMMERCIAL SEXUAL EXPLOITATION AND SEX TRAFFICKING OF MI-
NORS IN THE UNITED STATES 42 (Ellen Wright Clayton et al. eds., 2013) [hereinaf-
ter NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL REPORT]; LINDA A. SMITH, SAMANTHA HEALY
VARDAMAN & MELISSA A. SNOW, SHARED HOPE INT’L, THE NATIONAL REPORT ON
DOMESTIC MINOR SEX TRAFFICKING 4).
41. Terry Coonan, The Trafficking Victims Protection Act: A Work in Progress, 1 IN-
TERCULTURAL HUM. RTS. L. REV. 99 (2006). Modern slavery is an umbrella term
for “the act of recruiting, harboring, transporting, providing, or obtaining a per-
son for compelled labor or commercial sex acts through the use of force, fraud, or
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turn back the momentum of trafficking in human flesh.42 During this
period, Congress, the courts, practitioners, and legal scholars high-
lighted the utter inadequacies of older, antiquated peonage statutes to
address the peculiarities of modern slavery.43 By way of illustration,
United States v. Kozminski provides a paradigmatic example of the
antiquated and narrow definition of involuntary servitude under 18
U.S.C. § 1584, the anti-slavery and peonage statute.44 The Kozminski
Court ruled that involuntary servitude only occurred if a defendant
used violence or threats of force to coerce the labor or services of an-
other.45 The emphasis on force or threats of force completely elided
the psychological coercion pimps and traffickers effectively deploy to
groom, socialize, control, and imprison sex-trafficking victims46—let
alone the heightened detection these same individuals employ to pro-
file their victims and identify preexisting vulnerability and precarity
for purposes of unmitigated manipulation.47
Recognizing the pervasiveness of human trafficking, the limita-
tions of antiquated peonage statutes to eradicate the problem, and the
empirically supported abuses inflicted on trafficking victims, Congress
stepped into the fray of the international and national flesh trade.48
In 2000, Congress federalized human trafficking through the passage
coercion.” What is Modern Slavery?, U.S. DEP’T OF ST., https://www.state.gov/j/tip/
what [https://perma.unl.edu/R7GN-3T3F].
42. ALISON SISKIN & LIANA SUN WYLER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., TRAFFICKING IN PER-
SONS: U.S. POLICY AND ISSUES FOR CONGRESS 9 (2012).
43. See 22 U.S.C. § 7101(b)(13) (2000) (noting that with regard to U.S. Supreme
Court decisions, federal law that criminalizes involuntary servitude should be
interpreted narrowly).
44. 18 U.S.C. § 1584 (2012); United States v. Kozminski, 487 U.S. 931, 931–76
(1988).
45. Kozminski, 487 U.S. at 952.
46. Id. at 931. Many feminist scholars suggest that solely thinking of coercion in
terms of physical force does not place enough significant emphasis on the various
nonphysical tactics that can be just as coercive as physical abuse, if not more so.
Framing coercion as physical force undermines the ability of the justice system to
address issues such as sex trafficking and domestic violence. Without recognition
that isolation, intimidation, and controlling or possessive behaviors play a funda-
mental role in victimization, the courts hear one side of the victim’s story only. By
taking nonphysical forms of coercion into consideration, the legal system could
improve its ability to effectively prosecute domestic violence and sex-trafficking
cases, among other crimes involving a perpetrator and a victim. See generally
Mary Ann Dutton & Lisa A. Goodman, Coercion in Intimate Partner Violence:
Toward a New Conceptualization, 52 SEX ROLES 743 (2005); Tamara L. Kuennen,
Analyzing the Impact of Coercion on Domestic Violence Victims: How Much is Too
Much, 22 BERKELEY J. GENDER L. & JUST. 2 (2007).
47. Eighty-five percent of prostituted children in one New York study report having
been victims of child abuse and neglect. GRAGG ET AL., supra note 38, at 42.
48. H.R. REP. NO. 106-487, pt. 2 (2000).
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of the Trafficking Victims Protection Act (TVPA)49 and reauthorized
the TVPA as the Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act
(TVPRA) in 2003,50 2006,51 2008,52 and most recently in 201353 (col-
lectively the TVPRA).54 The legislative history of the TVPRA specifi-
cally recognizes that at the beginning of the twenty-first century
modern slavery was ubiquitous worldwide.55 In 2008, in response to
49. Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-386,
div. A, 114 Stat. 1464, 1466–91 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 22
U.S.C.).
50. Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-193,
117 Stat. 2875 (2003) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18 and 22
U.S.C.).
51. Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-164,
119 Stat. 3558 (2005) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18 and 22
U.S.C.).
52. William Wilberforce Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of 2008,
Pub. L. No. 110-457, 122 Stat. 5044 (2008) (codified as amended in scattered sec-
tions the U.S.C.).
53. Violence Against Women Reauthorization Act of 2013, Pub. L. No. 113-4, 127
Stat. 54 (codified as amended in scattered sections of the U.S.C.).
54. At the outset, it is important to note that the TVPA was passed during an era of
increased attention toward victims’ rights. After decades of being ignored, si-
lenced, and marginalized, crime victims politically mobilized and pressured Con-
gress to pass the 2004 Crime Victims’ Rights Act (CVRA). Blanche Bong Cook,
Stepping into the Gap: Violent Crime Victims, the Right to Closure, and a Discur-
sive Shift Away from Zero Sum Resolutions, 101 KY. L.J. 671, 721 (2013) [herein-
after Cook, Stepping into the Gap] (citing Crime Victims’ Rights Act, Pub. L. No.
108-405, § 102(a), 118 Stat. 2260, 2261–62 (2004) (codified as amended at 18
U.S.C. § 3771 (2006))). The Crime Victims’ Rights Act provides victims of violent
crimes with several enumerated rights:
(1) the right to be reasonably protected from the accused; (2) the right to
notification of public court and parole proceedings and of any release of
the accused; (3) the right not to be excluded from public court proceed-
ings under most circumstances; (4) the right to be heard in public court
proceedings relating to bail, the acceptance of a plea bargain, sentencing,
or parole; (5) the right to confer with the prosecutor; (6) the right to resti-
tution under the law; (7) the right to proceedings free from unwarranted
delays; (8) the right to be treated fairly and with respect to one’s dignity
and privacy; (9) the right to be informed in a timely manner of any plea
bargain or deferred prosecution agreement; and (10) the right to be in-
formed of the statutory rights and services to which one is entitled.
§ 3771.
55. Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-386,
div. A, 114 Stat. 1464, 1466–91 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 22
U.S.C.). The data on sex-trafficking numbers continues to vary; however, it is
estimated that between 200,000 and 300,000 minors are victims of commercial
sexual exploitation in the United States each year. S. Res. 340, 113th Cong.
(2014); S. 1518, 113th Cong. (2013). For such reports, see NAT’L RESEARCH COUN-
CIL REPORT, supra note 40, at 42 (noting one estimate that the number of minors
at risk is between 244,000 and 325,000); SMITH ET AL., supra note 40, at 4; Butler,
Bridge Over Troubled Water, supra note 9, at 1338. The Center for Missing Chil-
dren states that at least 100,000 native minors are prostituted each year in the
United States. Joe Markman, 52 Children Rescued in Nationwide Sex-Trafficking
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this epidemic, the TVPRA federalized sex-trafficking prosecutions
under 18 U.S.C. § 1591(a).56 Additionally, and in order to provide trac-
tion for the prosecutorial strength of sex-trafficking prosecutions, TV-
PRA enacted a number of specific obstruction provisions designed to
prevent individuals from tampering and interfering with sex-traffick-
ing prosecutions. Section 1591(d) has its own obstruction provision,
providing for imprisonment up to twenty years for impeding a sex-
trafficking prosecution.57
Recognizing the recidivist tendencies associated with sex crimes,
the need to protect the community, and the added penal interest in
public shaming, Congress passed the Sex Offender Registration and
Notification Act (SORNA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 16901–02.58 SORNA man-
dates that anyone convicted of sex trafficking under § 1591, which in-
cludes § 1591(a), sex trafficking, and § 1591(d) (obstructing a sex
trafficking prosecution), must register as a sex offender in the na-
tional sex offender registry.59 It is clear that sex traffickers must reg-
ister as sex offenders; however, it is unclear whether those convicted
of obstruction in a sex-trafficking prosecution under § 1591(d) are also
required to register.
Raids, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 27, 2009, http://articles.latimes.com/2009/oct/27/nation/
na-child-prostitution27 [https://perma.unl.edu/5E3Z-9XMR] (noting an estimate
by Ernie Allen, President and CEO of the National Center for Missing and Ex-
ploited Children, that roughly “100,000 children are still involved in sex traffick-
ing in the U.S. [and] that the problem is growing”).
56. 18 U.S.C. § 1591(a) (2012).
57. § 1591(d).
58. 42 U.S.C. §§ 16901–02 (2012); H.R. Rep. 109-218(I) (daily ed. Sept. 9, 2005)
(Statement of Rep. Sensenbrenner).
59. 42 U.S.C. § 16911(3)(A)(i) (2012); SORNA: Sex Offenses Under SORNA, OFF. OF
SEX OFFENDERS, MONITORING, APPREHENDING, REGISTERING, AND TRACKING [here-
inafter Sex Offenses Under SORNA], https://www.smart.gov/sorna.htm [https://
perma.unl.edu/5WAM-Q7KQ]. The following federal offenses also require sex-of-
fender registration under 18 U.S.C. §§ 2241–52, 2260, 2421–25 (2012): aggra-
vated sexual abuse; sexual abuse; sexual abuse of a minor or ward; abusive
sexual contact; offenses resulting in death; sexual exploitation of children; selling
or buying children; material involving the sexual exploitation of minors; material
containing child pornography; misleading domain names on the internet; mis-
leading words or digital images on the internet; production of sexually explicit
depictions of a minor for import into the United States; transporting minors for
illegal sexual activity; coercion and enticement of a minor for illegal sexual activ-
ity; travel with the intent to engage in illicit sexual conduct with a minor; engag-
ing in illicit sexual conduct in foreign places; failing to file factual statements
about an alien individual; and transmitting information about a minor to further
criminal sexual conduct.
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IV. THE CANONS OF STATUTORY INTERPRETATION
A. Plain Language of §§ 1591 and 16911
The question of whether federal sex-trafficking obstructionists
should register under the sex offender registry involves the statutory
interpretation of several key federal statutes: (1) 18 U.S.C. § 1591(a),
which prohibits sex trafficking; (2) 18 U.S.C. § 1591(d), which prohib-
its obstructing a sex-trafficking prosecution; and (3) 42 U.S.C.A.
§ 16911, which provides the relevant provisions of SORNA that man-
date sex-offender registration. The relevant portion of each of these
provisions is provided below.
Section 1591 provides:
(a)Whoever knowingly—
(1) in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce . . . recruits, entices, harbors,
transports, provides, obtains, or maintains by any means a person; or
(2) benefits, financially or by receiving anything of value, from participation in
a venture which has engaged in an act described in violation of paragraph (1),
knowing, or in reckless disregard of the fact, that means of force, threats of
force, fraud, coercion described in subsection (e) (2), or any combination of
such means will be used to cause the person to engage in a commercial sex act,
or that the person has not attained the age of 18 years and will be caused to
engage in a commercial sex act, shall be punished as provided in subsection
(b).60
In summary, § 1591(a) criminalizes two basic forms of sex trafficking:
(1) sex trafficking of adults through force or fraud, and (2) sex traffick-
ing of children.61 As for the first form, force and fraud, it is a crime for
anyone to recruit or entice a person to engage in a commercial sex act
“knowing or in reckless disregard of the fact, that means of force, ter-
eats of force, fraud, [or] coercion . . . will be used to cause the [victim-
ized] person to engage” in such an act.62 Significantly, this portion of
the statute does not limit the definition of the trafficked person to in-
dividuals under 18 years of age.63 As for the second form, child or mi-
nor trafficking, § 1591(a) prohibits anyone from recruiting or enticing
a person, “knowing or in reckless disregard of the fact . . . that the
[victimized] person has not attained the age of 18 years and will be
caused to engage in a commercial sex act.”64 In contrast to the earlier
prong of the statute, here, the recruitment or enticement into commer-
cial sex specifically references a minor and is not limited to situations
where force, fraud, or coercion plays a part; thus, as a legal matter,
60. § 1591(a). The term “commercial sex act” means any sex act for which anything of
value is given to or received by any person. See 22 U.S.C. § 7102 (2012).
61. See generally § 1591(a) (explaining the types of sex trafficking that are criminal-
ized by SORNA).
62. Pub. L. No. 114–22, tit. I, § 109, 129 Stat. 239 (2015).
63. § 1591(a).
64. Id.
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under federal sex-trafficking law, minors cannot consent to sex traf-
ficking.65 Consequently, proof of force, fraud, or coercion is not re-
quired to prosecute child sex trafficking.66 The converse is true for
persons over the age of 18—evidence of force, fraud, or coercion is
required.67
Section 1591(b) provides the mandatory minimums for violations of
§ 1591(a). Section 1591(b) states:
(b) The punishment for an offense under subsection (a) is—
(1) if the offense was effected by means of force, threats of force, fraud, or
coercion described in subsection (e)(2), or by any combination of such means,
or if the person recruited, enticed, harbored, transported, provided, or ob-
tained had not attained the age of 14 years at the time of such offense, by a
fine under this title and imprisonment for any term of years not less than 15
or for life; or
(2) if the offense was not so effected, and the person recruited, enticed, har-
bored, transported, provided, or obtained had attained the age of 14 years but
had not attained the age of 18 years at the time of such offense, by a fine
under this title and imprisonment for not less than 10 years or for life.68
In summary, § 1591(b) provides for a fifteen-year-to-life sentence for
an offense involving force, fraud, or coercion, or an offense involving a
minor under fourteen years old without regard to force, fraud, or coer-
cion. It also establishes a ten-year-to-life sentence involving a minor
over fourteen years of age but less than eighteen years of age where no
force, fraud, or coercion is implicated.69 Congress clearly affirmed in
§ 1591(b) that two separate crimes are delineated in § 1591(a) by pro-
viding separate punishments for each. One is an offense “effected by
means of force, threats of force, fraud, or coercion” or the victim had
not attained the age of fourteen, and the other is an offense where a
person who was at least fourteen, but younger than eighteen, was re-
cruited or enticed into a commercial sex act.70 It is imperative to note
this delineation because the obstruction provision in § 1591(d) also
65. See United States v. Campbell, 764 F.3d 880 (8th Cir. 2014) (finding evidence of
other acts of prostitution to be immaterial in a prosecution for sex trafficking of a
minor and would have served only to show that other people may have been
guilty of the same offense because minors cannot consent to prostitution or sex
trafficking); United States v. Robinson, 508 F. App’x 867, 870 (11th Cir. 2013)
(finding that the defendant’s assertion that a minor sex-trafficking victim was
not forced could not stand because “minors cannot consent to prostitution”);
United States v. Brooks, 610 F.3d 1186 (9th Cir. 2010) (holding that a minor’s
consent is insufficient to defend against sexual offenses like sex trafficking or
child molestation).
66. Campbell, 764 F.3d at 888.
67. Id.
68. § 1591(b).
69. § 1591(b)(2).
70. AMY O’NEIL RICHARD, CTR. FOR STUDY OF INTELLIGENCE, INTERNATIONAL TRAF-
FICKING IN WOMEN TO THE UNITED STATES: A CONTEMPORARY MANIFESTATION OF
SLAVERY AND ORGANIZED CRIME (1999), http://www.cia.gov/csi/monograph/women
/trafficking.pdf [https://perma.unl.edu/VC5K-UHXL].
154 NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 96:138
has its own penalty provision,71 signaling Congress’s intent to make
§ 1591(d) a crime distinct from sex trafficking, and therefore, as ar-
gued infra, impervious to the same punishments as sex trafficking,
particularly sex-offender registration.
The plain language of the sex-trafficking obstruction provision in
§ 1591(d) simply states: “Whoever obstructs, attempts to obstruct, or
in any way interferes with or prevents the enforcement of this section,
shall be fined under this title, imprisoned for a term not to exceed 20
years, or both.”72 Section 1591(d) has its own penalty provision within
the text of the subsection itself and it does not cross-reference the “sex
trafficking” contemplated in § 1591(a).73 This distinction is imperative
to note when determining whether obstructionists must register be-
cause it indicates that Congress clearly distinguished obstruction
from sex trafficking. Section 1591(d) is not entangled with the age and
force elements that undergird § 1591(a).74 Moreover, § 1591(d) has its
own penalty provision separate and apart from § 1591(b), further indi-
cating Congress’s intent to draw a clear distinction between sex traf-
ficking and obstruction. This distinction is particularly salient
because it signals that Congress did not expect obstructionists would
be sanctioned as sex traffickers.
Section 1591 does not itself reference sex-offender registration;
rather, obstructionist registration comes from the text of SORNA.75
SORNA states: “A sex offender shall register, and keep the registra-
tion current, in each jurisdiction where the offender resides, where the
offender is an employee, and where the offender is a student.”76 In its
definitional section, SORNA defines “sex offender” as “an individual
who was convicted of a sex offense.”77 Under the first prong of the
section defining “sex offense,” SORNA states that “sex offense” “has an
71. § 1591(d).
72. 42 U.S.C. § 16911 (2012) states the following:
The term ‘tier II sex offender’ means a sex offender other than a tier III
sex offender whose offense is punishable by imprisonment for more than
1 year and . . . is comparable to or more severe than [sex trafficking
(among other enumerated offenses)], when committed against a minor,
or an attempt or conspiracy to commit such an offense against a minor.
No court has specifically defined obstruction under § 1591(d). In general, the ob-
struction provision in this section tends to follow the definitions for obstruction
given in broad federal statutes addressing obstruction.
73. § 1591(d).
74. Compare § 1591(d), with § 1591(a).
75. For relevant definitions, including the Amie Zyla expansion of sex offender defini-
tion and expanded inclusion of child predators, see 42 U.S.C. § 16911 (2012).
76. 42 U.S.C. § 16913(a) (2006).
77. § 16911(1). The Amie Zyla expansion of the “sex offender” definition states that
“the term ‘sex offender’ means . . . (i) a criminal offense that has an element
involving a sexual act or sexual contact with another; (ii) a criminal offense that
is specified against a minor; [and] (iii) a Federal offense . . . under section 1591, or
chapter 109A, 110 . . . , or 117, of Title 18.” § 16911(5)(A)(i)–(iii).
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element involving a sexual act or sexual contact with another.”78 In its
third prong, SORNA’s definition of a sex offense also includes a viola-
tion of § 1591 in its entirety79 without drawing a distinction between
sex trafficking in § 1591(a) and pure obstruction in § 1591(d). Al-
though a § 1591(d) conviction would fall within the plain language of
SORNA, such a conviction would not necessarily involve a sexual act
or contact as described in SORNA or in § 1591(a).
In our case study, for example, it could be argued that Farah did
not engage in any sexual act, but rather purely obstructive conduct.80
After all, the government did not charge Farah in the sex-trafficking
conspiracy or separately under § 1591(a) or (b), thereby signaling that
Farah had no culpability for sex trafficking per se, at least not legally
cognizable culpability. Hypothetically it could be argued, however,
that Farah derived a benefit from the sex-trafficking conspiracy if he
were able to partake in illicit drugs or alcohol made possible by the
profits of the sex-trafficking conspiracy or that he had sexual access to
the sex-trafficking victims by virtue of his membership in the Somali
Outlaws or Somali Mafia. In any case, the government did not make
these claims. Farah’s case, however, presented a factual situation that
prosecutors may find compelling, particularly those keen on mandat-
ing registration for pure obstructionists. It could be argued that Farah
furthered the conspiracy by refusing to cooperate. His refusal may
have allowed the sex-trafficking conspiracy to thrive, escape detection,
and withstand prosecution. Unlike Farah’s case, mandating sex-of-
fender registration for an uncooperative sex-trafficking victim charged
with obstruction presents a less compelling case. In either scenario,
however, mandating registration for pure obstructionists under the
plain language of SORNA is absurd.81 Although statutory construc-
tion must start with the plain meaning, the reasoning behind
mandatory obstructionist registration has several strands. It begins,
as indeed it must, with the text, full context, and legislative history of
both SORNA as well as § 1591.
78. § 16911(5)(A)(i). Unfortunately, however, § 16911(5)(A)(iii) goes on to include the
whole of § 1591 within the definition of “sex offense,” which leads inquiry back to
whether obstructionists convicted under § 1591(d) must register.
79. § 16911(5)(A)(iii); OFFICE OF SEX OFFENDER SENTENCING, MONITORING, APPRE-
HENDING, REGISTERING, AND TRACKING, THE NATIONAL GUIDELINES FOR SEX OF-
FENDER REGISTRATION AND NOTIFICATION (2008) [hereinafter SEX OFFENDER
GUIDELINES], https://www.smart.gov/pdfs/final_sornaguidelines.pdf [https://
perma.unl.edu/WP2S-HYZM].
80. See supra Case Synopsis.
81. It is interesting to note that when designating the tiers of sex offenders, Congress
expressly designated Tier II sex offenders to include those convicted of “sex traf-
ficking” under § 1591. This clearly indicates that Congress is aware of the other
provisions within § 1591, including the obstruction provision in § 1591(d), which
does not reference sex trafficking.
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By its terms, § 1591 does not cross-reference SORNA or indicate
how it should mesh its obstruction scheme under § 1591(d) with analo-
gous provisions in preexisting statutes defining sex trafficking. Moreo-
ver, neither the legislative histories of § 1591 nor SORNA directly
addresses the issue of obstructionist registration. Still further,
SORNA mandated registration in 2006 when § 1591 only had a sex-
trafficking provision,82 thus, indicating that Congress only contem-
plated registration for traffickers, not obstructionists. However, in
2008 when Congress added the obstructionist provision of § 1591(d), it
did not amend SORNA to clarify that only traffickers had to register,
thus indicating its intent to subject both traffickers and obstructionist
to registration.
To resolve the issues, the starting point in statutory interpretation
is the statute’s plain meaning, if it has one.83 When the intent of Con-
gress is clear in the language of the statute, the inquiry of the courts
ends there.84 If, however, the statutory language lends itself to more
than one reasonable interpretation, the courts must find that inter-
pretation which can most fairly be said to be embedded in the statute,
in the sense of being most harmonious with its scheme and with the
general purposes that Congress manifested.85 When a statute is am-
biguous, the court may seek guidance in the statutory structure, rele-
vant legislative history, congressional purposes expressed in the
pertinent act, and general principles of law applicable to the circum-
stances of the statute to determine the appropriate interpretation.86
82. See 18 U.S.C. § 1591 (2006); 42 U.S.C. §§ 16912, 16913 (2006).
83. Statutory interpretation questions are reviewed by courts de novo. See United
States v. Rettelle, 165 F.3d 489, 491 (6th Cir. 1999). The language of the statute
is the starting point for interpretation, and it should also be the ending point if
the plain meaning of that language is clear. See United States v. Ron Pair En-
ters., Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 241 (1989); United States v. Choice, 201 F.3d 837, 840
(6th Cir. 2000). However, the Sixth Circuit also looks to “the language and design
of the statute as a whole” in interpreting the plain meaning of statutory lan-
guage. United States v. Meyers, 952 F.2d 914, 918 (6th Cir. 1992). Finally, we
may look to the legislative history of a statute if the statutory language is un-
clear. See In re Comshare, Inc. Sec. Litig., 183 F.3d 542, 549 (6th Cir.1999). If the
statute remains ambiguous after consideration of its plain meaning, structure,
and legislative history, we apply the rule of lenity in favor of criminal defendants.
See United States v. Hill, 55 F.3d 1197, 1206 (6th Cir. 1995).
84. United States v. Koyomejian, 946 F.2d 1450, 1453 (9th Cir. 1991) (citations
omitted).
85. Id. (citations omitted).
86. Fla. Power & Light Co. v. Lorion, 470 U.S. 729, 737 (1985). Courts will also con-
strue an ambiguous statute to avoid serious constitutional problems. Edward J.
DeBartolo Corp. v. Fla. Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 485 U.S. 568,
575 (1988) (citing NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chi., 440 U.S. 490, 499–501, 504
(1979)).
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“[P]lain meaning, like beauty, is sometimes in the eye of the be-
holder.”87 The plain language of SORNA’s § 16911(5)(A)(iii) includes
the whole of § 1591 within the definition of “sex offense.”88 As a mat-
ter of pure plain language, if convicted under any provision of § 1591,
sex-offender registration is statutorily mandated and is not discretion-
ary at sentencing. However, whether a statutory term is unambiguous
does not turn solely on dictionary definitions of its component words.89
Rather, “[t]he plainness or ambiguity of statutory language is deter-
mined not only by reference to the language itself, [but as well by] the
specific context in which that language is used, and the broader con-
text of the statute as a whole.”90 Courts must also “consider not only
the bare meaning of the word but also its placement and purpose in
the statutory scheme. ‘[T]he meaning of statutory language, plain or
not, depends on context.’”91 “[A] statute is to be considered in all its
parts when construing any one of them.”92 Purely obstructionist con-
duct does not fall within sexual acts or conduct that makes up the bulk
of SORNA’s statutory scheme. A defendant solely guilty of obstruction
may not have engaged in a sexual act or conduct, which is required
under the first prongs of § 16911(5)(A)(i).93 Under United States v.
Berry, a defendant’s tier determination under SORNA should utilize
the federal definitions of “sexual act” and “sexual contact” set forth in
18 U.S.C. § 2246.94 Section 2246 defines “sexual act” as follows:
(A) contact between the penis and the vulva or the penis and the anus, and for
purposes of this subparagraph contact involving the penis occurs upon pene-
tration, however slight;
(B) contact between the mouth and the penis, the mouth and the vulva, or the
mouth and the anus;
(C) the penetration, however slight, of the anal or genital opening of another
by a hand or finger or by any object, with an intent to abuse, humiliate, har-
ass, degrade, or arouse or gratify the sexual desire of any person; or
(D) the intentional touching, not through the clothing, of the genitalia of an-
other person who has not attained the age of 16 years with an intent to abuse,
87. Fla. Power & Light Co., 470 U.S. at 737.
88. Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 114-119, 130
Stat. 15 (defining “sex offender” as “an individual who is a sex offender by reason
of having been convicted of a sex offense against a minor.”).
89. Yates v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 1074, 1081–82 (2015) (holding that a fish is not
a “tangible object” within the meaning of FED. R. CRIM. P. 16).
90. Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337 (1997); see also Deal v. United States, 508
U.S. 129, 132 (1993) (“[It is a] fundamental principle of statutory construction
(and, indeed, of language itself) that the meaning of a word cannot be determined
in isolation, but must be drawn from the context in which it is used.”).
91. Bailey v. United States, 516 U.S. 137, 145 (1995) (quoting Brown v. Gardner, 513
U.S. 115, 118 (1994)).
92. Lexecon Inc. v. Milberg, 523 U.S. 26 (1998).
93. 42 U.S.C. § 16911(5)(A)(i) (2012).
94. United States v. Berry, 814 F.3d 192, 195, 200 (4th Cir. 2016).
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humiliate, harass, degrade, or arouse or gratify the sexual desire of any
person.95
Section 2246(3) defines “sexual contact” as “the intentional touching,
either directly or through the clothing, of the genitalia, anus, groin,
breast, inner thigh, or buttocks of any person with an intent to abuse,
humiliate, harass, degrade, or arouse or gratify the sexual desire of
any person.”96 As applied to the case study of this Article, the govern-
ment made no accusation that Farah had engaged in any conduct fall-
ing within the plain language definitions of sexual acts or contact.97
One may speculate that had Farah engaged in actual sexual acts, it is
conceivable that the government would have charged him as part of
the sex trafficking conspiracy. However, such absence of allegation,
conduct, and charges may be exactly why Farah should not be re-
quired to register as a sexual deviant.
To require registration where the defendant has not engaged in
conduct remotely akin to sexual activity contravenes the statutory
structure of SORNA. That scheme is reflected in the opening gambit,
or first prong, of the definitional structure defining “sexual offense” as
“a sexual act or sexual contact with another.”98 The meaning of doubt-
ful terms or phrases may be determined by reference to their relation-
ship with other associated words or phrases (noscitur a sociis).
SORNA’s definitional section begins with defining the sexual act.99 It
sets the stage. It is the frame. It becomes a possible associated term.
Farah’s refusal to testify and to continue his cooperation with the Gov-
ernment100 does not fit within the definition of a sexual offense that
would trigger registration.101
95. 18 U.S.C. § 2246 (2012) (providing definitions for the chapter).
96. § 2246(3).
97. See generally United States v. Farah, 766 F.3d 599, 601–05 (6th Cir. 2014).
98. 42 U.S.C. § 16911(5)(A)(i)–(iii) (2012).
99. § 2246.
100. See generally Farah, 766 F.3d at 601–05.
101. SORNA requires registration for “sex offenders.” Section 16911(1) defines “sex
offender” as “an individual who was convicted of a sex offense.” “Sex offense” is in
turn defined in § 16911(5) and related provisions. A “sex offender” as defined in
§ 16911(1) is a person who was “convicted” of a sex offense; consequently, a sex
offense “conviction” is required in order to determine whether a defendant is
within the minimum categories for which SORNA requires registration. Section
16911(5)(A)(ii) defines “sex offense” to include a conviction under § 1591 as well
as “a specified offense against a minor” under § 16911(5)(A)(ii). Section
16911(A)(ii) and (iii) define “a specified offense against a minor” to include kid-
napping and false imprisonment. Although kidnapping and false imprisonment
may not involve sexual conduct or contact, they are often attendant circum-
stances surrounding sexual offenses. Moreover, as discussed infra, the legislative
purpose behind SORNA contemplates sexual contact as part of the scheme of sex-
ual offenses. Thus, the inclusion of false imprisonment and kidnapping are not
dispositive as to whether SORNA contemplates nonsexual activity within its stat-
utory scheme.
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Moreover, Farah’s conduct does not fall within a categorical ap-
proach to the meaning of “sexual offense.” The Ninth Circuit stated in
dicta that a categorical approach should be used to determine whether
a criminal offense is a sex offense within the meaning of SORNA.102
The categorical approach requires a court to examine the elements of
the predicate offense instead of the underlying circumstances of the
crime to determine whether it fits the definition of a “sexual offense.”
In so doing, a court may interpret the predicate offense elements using
the “ ‘ordinary, contemporary, and common meaning’ of the statutory
words.”103 If the elements of the predicate sex offense “are the same
as, or narrower than” the SORNA offense, the two offenses should be
considered a categorical match.104 Regardless of the approach taken
to the definition of sexual act or contact, purely obstructionist conduct
does not fall within the ambit of a sexual act or contact within the
contemplation of SORNA.105 Section 1591(d) considers interference
with the enforcement of the federal sex trafficking provision. Thus, no
element of § 1591(d) fits within the term “sexual offense.”
SORNA’s statutory structure bodes against obstructionist registra-
tion. In addition, the legislative histories of both SORNA and § 1591
reflect a congressional preoccupation with protecting sex-trafficking
victims. Equipping prosecutors with the means to threaten not only
102. United States v. Mi Kyung Byun, 539 F.3d 982, 991 (9th Cir. 2008); United
States v. Westerman, No. CR 15-14-H-CCL, 2016 WL 843255, at *2 (D. Mont.
Mar. 1, 2016).
103. United States v. Lopez-Solis, 447 F.3d 1201, 1207 (9th Cir. 2006) (quoting United
States v. Trinidad-Aquino, 259 F.3d 1140, 1143 (9th Cir. 2001)).
104. See Descamps v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2276, 2281 (2013).
105. No definition of “obstruction” is listed in 18 U.S.C. § 1591 (2012). However, 18
U.S.C. § 1510 (2012), the general federal obstruction provision, articulates “ob-
struction” as follows:
Whoever willfully endeavors by means of bribery to obstruct, delay, or
prevent the communication of information relating to a violation of any
criminal statute of the United States by any person to a criminal investi-
gator shall be fined under this title, or imprisoned not more than five
years, or both.
Under § 1510, a person obstructs justice when they have a specific intent to ob-
struct or interfere with a judicial proceeding. For a person to be convicted of ob-
structing justice, they must not only have the specific intent to obstruct the
proceeding, but (1) the person must know that a proceeding was actually pending
at the time, (2) there must be a nexus between the defendant’s endeavor to ob-
struct justice and the proceeding, and (3) the defendant must have knowledge of
this nexus. Id. Regardless of whether one is prosecuted under § 1591(d) or § 1510,
an individual convicted under § 1591 generally can be given an enhanced sen-
tence for any potential involvement in the obstruction of a sex-trafficking prose-
cution. § 1591(d) (“Whoever obstructs, attempts to obstruct, or in any way
interferes with or prevents the enforcement of this section, shall be fined under
this title, imprisoned for a term not to exceed 20 years, or both.”); see also Farah,
766 F.3d 599 (affirming a witness’s conviction for attempting to obstruct the en-
forcement of § 1591(a) based on the witness’s refusal to testify).
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obstruction prosecution, but also mandatory registration for those sex-
trafficking victims that refuse to cooperate against their traffickers,
would undermine this concern.106 Although the legislative histories of
SORNA and § 1591 do not directly address obstructionist registration,
such mandated registration is clearly at odds with the legislative pur-
poses of SORNA and § 1591. Moreover, this view is fully consistent
with two tools of statutory interpretation. The first is the oft-cited rule
that “ambiguity concerning the ambit of criminal statutes should be
resolved in favor of lenity.”107 Each of these components is discussed
in further detail below.
B. The Legislative History
Unfortunately, the legislative histories of § 1591 and SORNA do
not squarely address the issue of obstructionist registration. Conse-
quently, a detailed analysis of the available legislative history is nec-
essary in order to glean the congressional purposes undergirding both
statutes and to contextualize them. The protection of sex-trafficking
victims and the recidivist nature of some sexual offenses saturated the
congressional preoccupations underlying § 1591 and SORNA.108 Ob-
structionist registration does not serve any of these congressional
purposes.
1. Section 1591’s Legislative History109
As of 2013, all fifty states had criminalized human trafficking, in-
cluding both forced labor and commercial sex trafficking.110 The Traf-
ficking Victims Protection Act of 2000 (TVPA) exemplifies concerted
106. The instant Article addresses the problems and inconsistencies of requiring regis-
tration for purely obstructive conduct under § 1591(d). Mandatory registration is
problematic for several reasons, not the least of which is the possibility of forcing
sex-trafficking victims who refuse to cooperate in a prosecution to register as of-
fenders after receiving a conviction under § 1591(d). This Article argues that such
a result is highly problematic and at odds with both SORNA and § 1591 gener-
ally. A separate question saved for another day is whether sex-trafficking victims
should ever be charged with obstruction where they refuse to participate and co-
operate in the sex-trafficking prosecution.
107. United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 347 (1971).
108. Jennifer Iacono, Note, The Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act and Its
Commerce Clause Implications, 17 WIDENER L. REV. 227, 251 (2011) (discussing
the protective purposes of SORNA).
109. When the plain-language rule and canons of statutory interpretation fail to
resolve statutory ambiguity, we will resort to legislative history. See, e.g., Lee v.
Bankers Trust Co., 166 F.3d 540, 544 (2d Cir. 1999).
110. Kelly Heinrich & Kavitha Sreeharsha, The State of State Human-Trafficking
Laws, JUDGES’ J., Winter 2013, http://www.americanbar.org/publications/judges_
journal/2013/winter/the_state_of_state_humantrafficking_laws.html [https://
perma.unl.edu/3C2Y-JXHK]. For a definition of “commercial sex act,” see 22
U.S.C. § 7102 (2010) and supra note 60. No state sex-trafficking statute has a
specific obstruction provision that mirrors the provision in § 1591. Therefore, no
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effort between both the state and federal sectors to eradicate human
trafficking.111
In 2000, Congress federalized sex trafficking by passing 18 U.S.C.
§ 1591.112 The TVPA and its subsequent reformulations expanded
prosecutorial authority to stem the flow of human trafficking in the
United States, including forced labor and sex trafficking.113 In the leg-
islative history accompanying the TVPA, Congress noted both that the
number of human-trafficking crimes was expanding exponentially and
that this form of modern slavery affected the lives of millions of wo-
men, men, and children internationally.114 The congressional history
also recognized the dearth of resources available to trafficking victims
such as housing, victim’s services, and physical and mental healthcare
resources.115
Congress passed the TVPA in the midst of international activism
and public outcries demanding the best practices to eradicate traffick-
ing in persons globally.116 More specifically, when feminist-based po-
litical activism began to gain traction, and as the broader public
became increasingly aware of the prevalence and brutal nature of traf-
ficking for both sexual and domestic labor, the United States re-
sponded with internationally concerted efforts.117 In the late 1990s,
the Clinton administration began to prioritize the eradication of sex
trafficking.118 Immediately before attending the United Nations
Fourth World Conference on Women, President Clinton established
the first Interagency Council on Women to operationalize trafficking
state case law currently exists to address whether obstruction of a sex-trafficking
investigation or prosecution is an offense that requires sex-offender registration.
111. Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of 2011, S. 1301, 112th Cong.
(2011).
112. 18 U.S.C. § 1591 (2012).
113. See H.R. REP. NO. 106-487, pt. 2, at 16 (2000) (providing an example of legislation
used to target sex trafficking).
114. Id. at 2.
115. Id. at 3.
116. Id. Some of these practices included economic incentives to prevent trafficking in
foreign countries, such as skills training and job counseling; victim assistance
programs abroad and in the U.S.; the development of minimum standards for the
elimination of trafficking and assistance to foreign countries to meet the mini-
mum standards; and the compilation of data and statistics about trafficking in
persons in the U.S. and worldwide. Id. at 7.
117. Marisa Silenzi Cianciarulo, What Is Choice? Examining Sex Trafficking Legisla-
tion Through the Lenses of Rape Law and Prostitution, 6 U. SAINT THOMAS L.J. 54
(2008).
118. See Anne Gallagher, Human Rights and the New UN Protocols on Trafficking
and Migrant Smuggling: A Preliminary Analysis, 23 HUM. RTS. Q. 975, 985 n.63
(2001) (“The United States initially led the move to reject the inclusion of non-
coerced sex work into the trafficking definitions although its support wavered
occasionally, apparently in response to domestic pressures.”).
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prohibitions gleaned from the conference.119 Later, in 1997 the United
States, in collaboration with the European Union, jointly engaged an
effort to combat sex trafficking in women and girls worldwide.120 By
1998, Congress and the State Department specifically prioritized the
eradication of human trafficking as an expressly enumerated prior-
ity.121 President Clinton’s Interagency Council on Women worked to
develop strategies to eradicate trafficking, provide assistance for and
protection to trafficking victims, and to increase the authority of pros-
ecutors to charge and convict traffickers.122 Consequently, Congress
noted that a law should be passed to help combat trafficking in per-
sons for purposes of labor and sex.123 Although the initial bill exclu-
sively addressed sex trafficking of women and children,
Representative Christopher Smith and Senator Sam Brownback pru-
dently expanded the bill to encompass both sex and labor trafficking of
boys and men.124
In 2000, after two years of refining, the original Trafficking Vic-
tims Protection Act (TVPA) made sex trafficking a federal crime.125 In
119. Welcome to the President’s Interagency Council on Women, U.S. DEP’T. OF ST.,
http://secretary.state.gov/www/picw [https://perma.unl.edu/UBX3-GR7X].
120. FRANCIS T. MIKO, TRAFFICKING IN WOMEN AND CHILDREN: THE U.S. AND INTERNA-
TIONAL RESPONSE, at CRS-14 (2004), http://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/cgi/
viewcontent.cgi?article =1059&context=key_workplace.
121. See id. at CRS-8 to CRS-9 (discussing President Clinton’s International Crime
Control Strategy).
122. See id. at CRS-9.
123. H.R. REP. NO. 106-487, pt. 2, at 2 (2000).
124. Id. (“Trafficking in persons is not limited to sex trafficking, but often involves
forced labor and other violations of internationally recognized human rights. The
worldwide trafficking of persons is a growing transnational crime, migration, eco-
nomics, labor, public health, and human rights problem that is significant on
nearly every continent.”); see also Elizabeth Bewley, Note, A New Form of “Ideo-
logical Capture”: Abortion Politics and the Trafficking Victims Protection Act, 8
HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 229, 239 (2014) (“Smith and Brownback ultimately ac-
cepted a broader definition that encompassed sex trafficking and trafficking into
other sectors . . . .”); Laura J. Lederer, Trafficking: A Women’s Issue, U.S. DEP’T
ST. ARCHIVE (Mar. 19, 2004), https://2001-2009.state.gov/g/tip/rls/rm/48308.htm
[https://perma.unl.edu/S6VF-4HWH] (noting that President Bush acknowledged
that prostitution, which fuels sex trafficking, is not only inherently dangerous to
women, but also men and children).
125. CIVIL RIGHTS DIV., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, REPORT ON THE TENTH ANNIVERSARY OF
THE TRAFFICKING VICTIMS PROTECTION ACT (2010) [hereinafter REPORT ON THE
TENTH ANNIVERSARY OF TVPA], https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/crt/leg-
acy/2010/12/14/tvpaanniversaryreport.pdf [https://perma.unl.edu/T7YB-VMQ4].
It is also important to note that the legislative history of 18 U.S.C. § 1591 (2012)
appears to reflect Congress’s acknowledgment of the effectiveness of feminist ac-
tivism in making the case that (1) traditional paradigms of understanding sex
trafficking as mere “prostitution” oversimplified the international dimensions of
sex trafficking and (2) that sex trafficking had to be contextualized within the
broader frame work of commercialized sex operations and within the broader
schema of human trafficking and exploitation. John Elrod, Note, Filling the Gap:
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the Senate, the bipartisan efforts of Senators Paul Wellstone and Sam
Brownback lead to the TVPA.126 According to the TVPA’s legislative
history, the massive amount of human trafficking occurring both in-
ternationally and domestically dominated Congress’s preoccupa-
tion.127 As part of its legislative findings, Congress noted all of the
following: at the beginning of the 21st century, slavery was a world-
wide epidemic;128 trafficking victimized at least 700,000 people within
or across international borders, with 50,000 of that number trafficked
into the United States each year;129 victims were primarily women
and children;130 and resources such as housing, victim’s services, and
physical and mental health care resources were scarce for exited traf-
ficking victims.131 As a result of these congressional findings, the
TVPA became a comprehensive network of statutes designed to in-
crease government authority to eradicate labor and sex trafficking.132
The laws encompassed in the TVPA and the following incarnations
under the TVPRA helped expand the reach of prosecutorial attempts
to stem the flow of sex trafficking in the United States.133 The TVPA
included victim protection and prevention programs, and broadly ex-
panded the scope of criminal anti-trafficking laws.134
Congress reauthorized the TVPA as the William Wilberforce Traf-
ficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act three times—in 2003,
2005, and 2008.135 In 2008 Congress added § 1591(d) to the statute,
providing an extra layer of protection for witnesses involved in sex-
trafficking prosecutions.136 Senator Joe Biden was the sponsor of Sen-
Refining Sex Trafficking Legislation to Address the Problem of Pimping, 68 VAND.
L. REV. 961, 964–67 (2015).
126. REPORT ON THE TENTH ANNIVERSARY OF TVPA, supra note 125.
127. H.R. REP. NO. 106-939 (2000) (Conf. Rep.).
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 4; see Britta S. Loftus, Coordinating U.S. Law on Immigration and Human
Trafficking: Lifting the Lamp to Victims, 43 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 143,
165–67 (2011) (providing background information regarding the network of the
Trafficking Victim Protection Act, including its reauthorizations).
133. H.R. REP. NO. 106-939 (2000) (Conf. Rep.).
134. Id.
135. See William Wilberforce Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of
2008, Pub. L. No. 110-457, tits. I–III, 122 Stat. 5044, 5044–87 (2008); Trafficking
Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-164, 119 Stat.
3558 (2005); Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of 2003, Pub. L.
No. 108-193, 117 Stat. 2875 (2003). To “authorize” a bill means to allocate fund-
ing for it for a number of years or indefinitely. Reauthorization of an act extends
or modifies existing programs and agencies for a future timeframe. See generally
Glossary, U.S. SENATE, http://www.senate.gov/reference/glossary_term/appropri-
ation.htm [https://perma.unl.edu/36BP-57Q9].
136. 154 CONG. REC. H10888-01 (daily ed. Dec. 10, 2008) (statement of Rep. Berman)
(regarding the William Wilberforce Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthoriza-
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ate Bill 3061, the Senate version of the 2008 reauthorization of the
TVPA, and with bipartisan support, four Democratic and two Republi-
can Senators cosponsored the bill.137 In the House of Representatives,
Tom Lantos sponsored House Bill 3887 with a bipartisan group of
forty-two additional representatives supporting.138 This version
passed in the House of Representatives by an overwhelming majority,
receiving only two votes against it.139 Congress determined that the
best course of action would be to proceed with a clean bill, House Bill
7311, which Congress signed into law as the William Wilberforce Vic-
tims of Trafficking Protection Reauthorization Act of 2008.140
The Senate version of the 2008 reauthorization bill was the only
one of the two versions from the House and Senate to include an ob-
struction provision in 18 U.S.C. § 1591 from its inception.141 The in-
clusion of an obstruction provision within the text of § 1591 presented
an irony because obstructing and tampering with federal prosecutions
are federal crimes in and of themselves and can be prosecuted sepa-
rately under 18 U.S.C. §§ 1501, 1503, 1505, 1512, and 1513, which can
result in a fine and imprisonment for up to one year.142 Section
tion Act of 2008’s hearing before the House Commission on Foreign Affairs, En-
ergy and Commerce).
137. William Wilberforce Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of 2008,
S. 3061, 110th Cong. (2008). Democratic Senators Dianne Feinstein, Richard
Durbin, Benjamin Cardin, and Arlen Specter, and Republican Senators Samuel
Brownback and Orrin Hatch were the bipartisan sponsors of this bill. Id.
138. William Wilberforce Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of 2007,
H.R. 3887, 110th Cong. (2007).
139. Id. The bill received 405 votes in its favor in the House of Representatives. Two
House Republicans, Jeff Flake and Paul Broun, voted against the passage of the
bill. This was statistically notable, meaning that the votes were the “most sur-
prising, or least predictable, given how other members of each voter’s party voted
and other factors.” See H.R. 3887 (110th): William Wilberforce Trafficking Vic-
tims Protection Reauthorization Act of 2007, GOVTRACK, https://www.govtrack.us/
congress/votes/110-2007/h1124 [https://perma.unl.edu/YE2Y-2H43].
140. William Wilberforce Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of 2008,
H.R. 7311, 110th Cong. (2008). According to the U.S. Senate’s glossary of terms, a
clean bill is a bill assembled out of changes made in committee and the original
portions of the bill that are put together and produced as a clean bill, which can
serve to speed up Senate action because it allows the bill to avoid floor considera-
tion of each separate amendment made in committee. Glossary, U.S. SENATE,
https://www.senate.gov/reference/glossary_term/clean_bill.htm [https://perma.
unl.edu/BN3V-ZWZX].
141. Memorandum from Alison Siskin, Specialist in Immigration Policy, Domestic So-
cial Policy Division, & Clare Ribando Seelke, Analyst in Latin American Affairs,
Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division, at CRS-9 (June 24, 2008), http://
library.niwap.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/IMM-Memo-TVPRASelectDifferences
-06.24.08.pdf [https://perma.unl.edu/H895-7X9C].
142. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1501–21 (2012). Some of the most general obstruction provisions al-
ready illegalize the obstruction of judicial proceedings, § 1503, witness tamper-
ing, § 1512, witness retaliation, § 1513, and contempt, which is a crime that has
developed out of a combination of statutory and common law. CHARLES DOYLE,
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1591(d) makes the obstruction and attempted obstruction of a sex-
trafficking prosecution illegal and punishable by not more than
twenty years in prison, up to a $250,000 fine, or both.143 Regardless of
whether one is prosecuted under § 1591(d), an individual convicted
under § 1591 generally can be given an enhanced sentence for ob-
structing a sex trafficking prosecution.144
Prior to the passage of the 2008 reauthorization of the Wilberforce
Act, the only statute to contain a specific obstruction provision was 18
U.S.C. § 1581, which prohibits peonage.145 Following the 2008
reauthorization, Congress added an obstruction provision to 18 U.S.C.
§§ 1583 (enticement to slavery), 1584 (holding another in involuntary
servitude), 1590 (trafficking with respect to peonage, slavery, involun-
tary servitude, and forced labor), 1591 (sex trafficking by force, fraud,
or coercion or sex trafficking a minor), and 1592 (document abuse re-
lated to peonage, slavery, involuntary servitude, and forced labor).146
While the legislative history does not provide the rationale for ad-
ding such specific provisions to these statutes, there are several rea-
sons to do so. Primarily, these specific obstruction provisions broaden
and enhance the power of prosecutors to charge individuals for ob-
struction-related crimes.147 Section 1591(d)’s specific obstruction pro-
vision enables the government to charge a defendant with obstruction
for lying to or otherwise obstructing an investigation by federal agents
or state and local law-enforcement officials.148 Because sex-trafficking
cases often begin either on the state and local level or in conjunction
with federal agents and task forces, this is an added boon to prosecu-
tors because it lessens the evidentiary burden on the prosecution.149
In addition, these obstruction provisions may reflect Congress’s recog-
CONG. RESEARCH SERV., OBSTRUCTION OF JUSTICE: AN OVERVIEW OF SOME OF THE
FEDERAL STATUTES THAT PROHIBIT INTERFERENCE WITH JUDICIAL, EXECUTIVE, OR
LEGISLATIVE ACTIVITIES (2014) [hereinafter DOYLE, OBSTRUCTION OF JUSTICE],
https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RL34303.pdf [https://perma.unl.edu/DDM8-2JJQ].
143. DOYLE, OBSTRUCTION OF JUSTICE, supra note 142.
144. Id. at 12.
145. See 18 U.S.C. § 1581 (2012) (“Whoever obstructs, attempts to obstruct, or in any
way interferes with or prevents the enforcement of this section shall be
liable . . . .”).
146. CHARLES DOYLE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., THE WILLIAM WILBERFORCE TRAFFICK-
ING VICTIMS PROTECTION REAUTHORIZATION ACT OF 2008 (P.L. 110-457): CRIMINAL
LAW PROVISIONS (2009), http://library.niwap.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/IMM-
Man-TVPRACRSReport-01.29.09.pdf [https://perma.unl.edu/K556-7YH6]; see
also 18 U.S.C. §§ 1583, 1584, 1590–92 (2012) (providing examples of obstruction-
ist statutes included directly in the sections sanctioning sex trafficking).
147. Pamela Chen & Monica Ryan, Federal Prosecution of Human Traffickers, in THE
LAWYER’S MANUAL ON HUMAN TRAFFICKING: PURSUING JUSTICE FOR VICTIMS
271–82 (Jill Goodman & Dorchen Leidholdt eds., 2011).
148. Id.
149. HEATHER J. CLAWSON, NICOLE DUTCH & MEGAN CUMMINGS, CALIBER, LAW EN-
FORCEMENT RESPONSE TO HUMAN TRAFFICKING AND THE IMPLICATIONS FOR VIC-
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nition that trafficking victims remain vulnerable to the retaliatory
conduct of their former traffickers and the sometimes backlash re-
sponses—in the form of victim blaming, for example—that victims en-
dure when they cooperate in prosecutions. These obstruction
provisions remain much-needed protection to an already vulnerable
and precarious population. Lessening the government’s evidentiary
load further evinced Congress’s expressed intent to protect victims of
sex trafficking, which was further demonstrated by the inclusion of a
T-Visa for exited and cooperating trafficking victims.150
2. The Use of the T-Visa in Discouraging Obstruction
Along with much-needed resource allocation to trafficking victims,
through the passage of the TVPRA, Congress sought to protect traf-
ficking victims by giving them opportunities to obtain temporary and
eventually permanent residence via a T-Visa.151 In tandem with the
obstruction provision in § 1591(d), the T-Visa incentivizes trafficking
victims to cooperate in sex-trafficking investigations and prosecu-
tions.152 Congress understood that the victim’s lack of citizenship or
documented status created a precarity in smuggled trafficking victims
that increased their susceptibility to threats of force and coercion—
particularly their vulnerability as undocumented workers to threats
of deportation as a means of trapping them in the sex trade.153 In an
effort to entrap victims in the sex trade, traffickers often convince vic-
tims that contacting law enforcement would result in their imprison-
ment and eventual deportation.154 In response to the plight and
precarity of trafficking victims, Congress created the T-Visa.155
Although Congress created the T-Visa as a partial solution to the
threat of deportation for victims, it also predicated the victim’s ob-
taining a T-Visa on the victim’s ongoing cooperation with investiga-
tions and prosecutions.156 Thus, in order to obtain a T-Visa and to
TIMS: CURRENT PRACTICES AND LESSONS LEARNED (2006), http://www.ncjrs.gov/
pdffiles1/nij/grants/216547.pdf [https://perma.unl.edu/PX3Y-GNU6].
150. See infra subsection IV.B.2.
151. Victims of Human Trafficking: T Nonimmigrant Status, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IM-
MIGR. SERVS., https://www.uscis.gov/humanitarian/victims-human-trafficking-
other-crimes/victims-human-trafficking-t-nonimmigrant-status [https://
perma.unl.edu/Q9Q7-B2CX] (last updated Oct. 3, 2011).
152. HOMELAND SEC., U AND T VISA LAW ENFORCEMENT RESOURCE GUIDE 9 (2011),
https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/PM_15-4344%20U%20and%
20T%20Visa%20Law%20Enforcement%20Resource%20Guide%2011.pdf [https://
perma.unl.edu/NVY9-8CV2].
153. Id. See generally 18 U.S.C. § 1101 (2012) (providing definitions for the Immigra-
tion and Nationality chapter or 8 U.S.C.); 8 U.S.C. § 1184 (2012) (providing rules
for admission of nonimmigrants).
154. CLAWSON ET AL., supra note 149, at 33.
155. Id. at 6.
156. Id.
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avoid deportation, sex-trafficking victims must cooperate with the
prosecution of their traffickers or any other trafficking operations
known to them.157 Minor sex-trafficking victims under the age of fif-
teen, however, are exempt from this requirement.158 Many critics
have argued that the T-Visa is problematic because it is contingent
upon a sex-trafficking victim’s continued cooperation with the govern-
ment, requiring them to participate actively in the investigation and
prosecution of their traffickers. While victims are not required to tes-
tify in sex-trafficking prosecutions, they essentially cannot refuse to
do so where the request to testify is reasonable.159 If the victim unrea-
sonably refuses to testify, the government may withdraw the T-
Visa.160 Some scholars and activists have argued that the quid pro
quo of the T-Visa forces trafficking victims to trade their traffickers
for prosecutors, each with the power and weaponry to order their lives
and to coerce their conduct.161 The coercive capacity of the T-Visa may
have led Congress to include a specific obstruction provision in the
TVPA when Congress reauthorized the TVPA in 2008. By adding both
a positive incentive in the form of a T-Visa, which provides a path to
citizenship, and a negative consequence through an obstruction provi-
sion, Congress sought to protect victims from their potentially retalia-
tory traffickers and to incentivize sex-trafficking victims to cooperate
with investigations and prosecutions.
The unwillingness of many sex-trafficking victims to testify
against their traffickers is particularly problematic because the
strength of the government’s case often rests on the testimony of those
victims.162 Although corroborating evidence serves as additional solid-
157. Id.
158. Id. In addition to the requirement that individuals comply with any requests
from prosecutors or law enforcement officers in the investigation and prosecution
of sex traffickers, eligibility for a T-Visa is also contingent on a showing that the
trafficking victim was lured into performing commercial sex acts by “force, fraud,
or coercion,” or other means of deception. Id. at 24.
159. U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., U AND T VISA LAW ENFORCEMENT RESOURCE
GUIDE, https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/PM_15-4344%20U%
20and%20T%20Visa%20Law%20Enforcement%20Resource%20Guide%2011.pdf
[https://perma.unl.edu/R4D9-ZZLV]. But note, the refusal to testify may make
the victim vulnerable to contempt charges.
160. Id. at 13.
161. Michael Kagan, Immigrant Victims, Immigrant Accusers, 48 U. MICH. J.L. RE-
FORM 915, 917 (2015). But see 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(T)(i)(III)(aa) (2012) (requir-
ing foreign trafficking victims who seek a T-Visa to cooperate with prosecutors
unless a statutory exceptions applies even though there are no mechanisms to
enforce the cooperation of victims with prosecutors or investigators).
162. Victims who are reluctant or unwilling to testify can be highly problematic for
prosecutors. If a victim does not want to testify or refuses to do so where the case
relies heavily on that victim’s testimony, the prosecutor can either motivate the
witness or allow the case to move forward without the necessary evidence, which
will almost certainly end in a loss or a dismissal. There are many tools prosecu-
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ity, the thrust of the evidence is the testimony of the actual victims
themselves. Sex-trafficking victims, however, are often problematic
witnesses because they are prey to layers of trauma,163 including sex-
ual and emotional abuse, often from immediate family members that
predate the sex trafficking, which also makes them enticing and vul-
nerable to traffickers in the first instance.164 Aside from a history of
sexual abuse, the sex trafficking itself, along with its attendant ma-
nipulations, is a form of torture.165 In addition to these waves of
trauma, cooperating with law enforcement and sharing the most inti-
mate, and perhaps embarrassing, details of their lives—including sex-
ual histories—with strangers—including jurors, investigators,
prosecutors, and judges—presents even more trauma.166 Prosecution-
induced trauma may also include protracted proceedings that eviscer-
ate a victim’s ability to gain closure and to put the incident behind her
or him,167 violations of privacy rights, public exposure, and anxiety
from unresolved prosecutions and anticipated testimony. Lacking any
representation in the courtroom, victims are vulnerable to the defen-
dant, the prosecution, and the courts.168 Sexually violated victims,
tors can use to motivate the victim to testify, including the promise of a T-Visa.
Some tools for motivation are not positive, however. Prosecutors can also use con-
tempt orders and the threat of obstruction charges to convince victims to testify.
See generally Stacy Caplow, What If There is No Client?: Prosecutors as “Counsel-
ors” of Crime Victims, 5 CLINICAL L. REV. 1, 12 (1998).
163. As Cheryl Butler has pointed out, victims of sex trafficking are often persons
made vulnerable to exploitation through structural racism and inequality, and
are disproportionately women of color. Butler also argues that state-sanctioned
structural racism and sexism have also made people of color vulnerable to physi-
cal and emotional abuse and hence, poor health. Forcing these victims in particu-
lar to register would be yet another layer of trauma inflicted on the already
traumatized. Cheryl Nelson Butler, The Racial Roots of Human Trafficking, 62
UCLA L. REV. 1464, 1476–77 (2015).
164. KAMALA D. HARRIS, CAL. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, THE STATE OF HUMAN TRAFFICKING IN
CALIFORNIA 21 (2012) (“Many domestic victims of sex trafficking are underage
runaways and/or come from backgrounds of sexual or physical abuse, incest, pov-
erty, or addiction.”); see also Butler, Bridge Over Troubled Water, supra note 9, at
1291 (“Prior sexual assaults groom minors for prostitution. . . . [A] history of child
sexual abuse lowers a child’s self-esteem to the point where he or she is made
vulnerable for subsequent abuse. Kids who flee incest or other forms of abuse in
their homes often become runaways or throwaways, the perfect prey for sexually
exploitative adults.”).
165. See generally OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE AND CO-ORDINATOR FOR
COMBATING TRAFFICKING IN HUMAN BEINGS, TRAFFICKING IN HUMAN BEINGS
AMOUNTING TO TORTURE AND OTHER FORMS OF ILL-TREATMENT (2013), https://
www.osce.org/cthb/103085?download=true [https://perma.unl.edu/CJA9-TQRQ].
166. Cook, Stepping into the Gap, supra note 54, at 690.
167. Id. at 672.
168. Id. Sex-trafficking victims are rarely persons of means. Furthermore, victims do
not have the right to counsel. For victims, this combination of disadvantages cre-
ates a formula for vulnerability throughout the criminal-justice process, as well
as an opening for a second wave of traumatization. See Lynette M. Parker, In-
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like sex-trafficking victims, are uniquely vulnerable to the defendants,
the former pimps, and traffickers. Victims have sometimes shared “in-
timate” relationships with their former traffickers and pimps, an inti-
macy dependent upon exploitation and sometimes reminiscent of an
overidentification with their victimizers akin to a Stockholm syn-
drome.169 Similarly, victims are vulnerable to the prosecution, partic-
ularly where the prosecution may coerce the victims to testify using
the coercive methods at their disposal.170
In conclusion, equipping prosecutors with the weaponry to coerce
sex-trafficking victims into testifying against their traffickers and co-
operating with the prosecution by waving the evil specter of obstruc-
tion registration contravenes Congress’s clear intent to protect
creasing Law Students’ Effectiveness When Representing Traumatized Clients: A
Case Study of the Katharine & George Alexander Community Law Center, 21
GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 163, 176 (2007) (“Researchers and scholars have noted that for
many traumatized clients litigation and the legal process can result in re-trauma-
tization.”). However, as Parker points out, if the legal process is handled cor-
rectly, it may be therapeutic. Id. at 165 As an example, Parker cites Yael Danieli,
discussing the importance of “public witnessing and giving testimony,” as well as
a “judgment by the court” acknowledging the harm done to the survivor, and the
“generat[ion] of records” documenting the harm committed against the survivor.
Id. at 176 n.48 (quoting Yael Danieli, Reappraising the Nuremberg Trials and
Their Legacy: The Role of Victims in International Law, 27 CARDOZO L. REV. 1633,
1640 (2006)). See generally Roger K. Pitman et al., Legal Issues in Posttraumatic
Stress Disorder, in TRAUMATIC STRESS: THE EFFECTS OF OVERWHELMING EXPERI-
ENCE ON MIND, BODY, AND SOCIETY 378, 378–97 (B.A. van der Kolk ed., 1996);
James Herbie DiFonzo, In Praise of Statutes of Limitations in Sex Offense Cases,
41 HOUS. L. REV. 1205, 1274 (2004) (noting that the effect of the legal process on
sexual assault victims “has been referred to as the ‘second injury’ or ‘second
wound”’); Edward J. Hickling et al., The Psychological Impact of Litigation: Com-
pensation Neurosis, Malingering, PTSD, Secondary Traumatization, and Other
Lessons from MVAS, 55 DEPAUL L. REV. 617, 630 (2006); Jennifer L. Wright,
Therapeutic Jurisprudence in an Interprofessional Practice at the University of
St. Thomas Interprofessional Center for Counseling and Legal Services, 17 SAINT
THOMAS L. REV. 509, 509 n.11 (2005) (“The risk of re-traumatization of clients
who have to repeat and relive their experiences of abuse, first in the lawyer’s
office and then in court, is serious.”); George K. Goodhue, Comment, Maryland v.
Craig: Balancing Sixth Amendment Confrontation Rights with the Rights of
Child Witnesses in Sexual Abuse Trials, 26 NEW ENG. L. REV. 497, 498 (2001)
(“An extensive body of professional research clearly demonstrates that many vic-
timized children, when forced to testify in open court in the presence of the ac-
cused, suffer a second victimization and traumatization.”).
169. Stockholm syndrome is a “psychological response wherein a captive begins to
identify closely with his or her captors, as well as with [the captors’] agenda and
demands.” Laura Lambert, Encyclopædia Britannica, Stockholm Syndrome,
BRITANNICA.COM, https://www.britannica.com/topic/Stockholm-syndrome [https://
perma.unl.edu/58GS-HMAB] (last updated Nov. 27, 2016). See generally id.
170. Caldwell, supra note 9 (illustrating the serious concerns regarding abuse of
prosecutorial discretion by explaining that sometimes, like in the case of Senator
Ted Stevens, prosecutors will purposefully fail to cooperate in order to achieve
their desired convictions).
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victims. International pressures, feminist activism, the victims’ rights
movement, and increased overcriminalization led Congress to attempt
to eradicate human trafficking, particularly sex trafficking, by federal-
izing sex-trafficking offenses.171 The legislative intent behind § 1591
is the eradication of commercialized sex of children and adults
through force and fraud. Congress passed the obstruction provision of
§ 1591(d) to provide an extra layer of protection to victims of sex traf-
ficking with an understanding that traffickers thwart the efforts of
their victims to avail themselves of law enforcement through both psy-
chological and physical coercion. Congress further demonstrated its
twofold interest in protecting sex-trafficking victims and liberating
them from the coercive threats and realities of their traffickers
through the passage of the T-Visa. At once, the T-Visa provided fur-
ther protection to sex-trafficking victims by eliminating their precari-
ous susceptibility and vulnerability to deportation while at the same
time incentivizing them to cooperate in prosecutions. Unlike obstruc-
tionist registration, the T-Visa is an incentive, as opposed to an irra-
tional punishment at odds with Congress’s clear intent to protect
victims. Similarly, SORNA is aimed at sexual conduct, particularly
sexual deviancy. Subjecting victims of sex trafficking to the pain and
humiliation of registration is at odds with the congressional intent to
address sexual deviancy and to protect victims.
3. The Legislative History of the Sex Offender Registration and
Notification Act
a. The History and Purpose of National Sex Offender
Registries
Criminal registry systems originated in the 1940s.172 SORNA is
the first title of the Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act of
2006.173 Additionally, all fifty states have sex offender registries that
comply with SORNA.174 From the outset, law enforcement used the
earliest sex offender registries as an investigatory tool to locate sus-
171. While § 1592 is explicitly inapplicable to the actual victims of sex trafficking,
§ 1591 contains no such provision. However, considering the ills of many states
that criminalize sex workers, prostitutes, and victims of sex trafficking while
paying little attention to the demand side or market incentives, like “pimps” and
“johns,” “[n]o prosecutor is likely to bring, no jury is likely to convict, and no judge
is likely to sustain” a case against a victim. CHARLES DOYLE, CONG. RESEARCH
SERV., SEX TRAFFICKING: AN OVERVIEW OF FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAW 5 (2015),
https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R43597.pdf [https://perma.unl.edu/RW3H-YXK2].
172. Terra R. Lord, Closing Loopholes or Creating More? Why a Narrow Application of
SORNA Threatens to Defeat the Statute’s Purpose, 62 OKLA. L. REV. 273, 276
(2010).
173. See SEX OFFENDER GUIDELINES, supra note 79, at 3. Also, 18 U.S.C. § 1591 (2012)
is listed as a qualifying offense in 42 U.S.C. § 16911(3)(A)(1) (2012).
174. Lord, supra note 172, at 275.
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pects.175 Although the registries were not available to the public origi-
nally, a number of highly publicized attacks on children in the 1990s
incentivized states to grant public access to registries.176 Through the
expansion of sex offender laws and public access to registries, Con-
gress intended to protect the community from sexually offensive
conduct.177
Prior to the enactment of SORNA, the Jacob Wetterling Crimes
Against Children and Sexually Violent Offender Registration Act of
1994 (the Wetterling Act) regulated the surveillance of sex offend-
ers.178 The Wetterling Act incentivized states to adopt sex-offender
registration laws and maintain sex offender registries that aligned
with the Department of Justice general guidelines.179 Although there
was some success with this effort, differing sex offender laws in each
state led to a striking lack of interstate uniformity between regis-
tries.180 By moving to different states, sex offenders evaded registra-
tion by capitalizing on the disjointed and misaligned state systems.181
Prior to the creation of a federal system, sex offenders only had to reg-
ister in the state in which the offense occurred, and if they moved out
of state, no notification was required, which made the tracking of of-
fenders across state borders problematic, if not impossible.182 As a re-
sult, according to a statement released by the National Center for
Missing and Exploited Children, over 100,000 out of a total of 603,000
sex offenders required to register had vanished from the system alto-
175. Id. at 276–77.
176. Id. at 277. See generally Elizabeth Garfinkle, Coming of Age in America: The Mis-
application of Sex-Offender Registration and Community-Notification Laws to
Juveniles, 91 CAL. L. REV. 163 (2003).
177. Garfinkle, supra note 176, at 165. The state of Washington, for example, was the
first state to pass a sex-offender-registration law that involved a community noti-
fication component in the wake of two highly publicized and gruesome sex of-
fender cases. Id. In 1989, Westley Dodd molested two young boys, killing both of
them and one other boy. Id. Upon arrest, Dodd claimed that if police released
him, he would sexually assault more children and enjoy it. Id. As a result, the
state of Washington convicted and executed the man. Id. A year later, police
found a young boy who had been physically and sexually assaulted by Earl
Shriner. Id. These cases sparked outrage in communities statewide. Id. The state
law in Washington set an example for other states to try out their own commu-
nity-notification provisions. Id.
178. SEX OFFENDER GUIDELINES, supra note 79, at 4.
179. Lord, supra note 172, at 278.
180. Id. at 280.
181. Id.
182. See id. at 280–81.
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gether.183 The absence of uniformity in state registry laws led Con-
gress to exact nationwide uniformity in the sex offender registry.184
The subsequent Adam Walsh Act of 2006 made SORNA the first
national sex offender registry.185 In its wide breadth, SORNA accom-
plished all of the following: it replaced the Wetterling Act standards
with a comprehensive set of rules and regulations addressing the spe-
cific crimes that require sex-offender registration;186 expanded the
classes of crimes for which regulation is required and mandated that
registrants provide more in-depth personal information;187 required
sex offenders to periodically make in-person appearances with their
probation or other regulatory offices or officers;188 classified sex
crimes that require registration into different tiers based on a number
of factors, including the age of the victim and the severity of the of-
fense;189 and solidified the concerted efforts of both state and federal
governments because it provided a uniformity of information and data
collection between the two entities, thereby incentivizing cooperation
between the two entities and maximizing protection to the public from
sexual abuse and exploitation.190 Currently, sex offender registries
exist both in the federal government as well as all fifty states and the
District of Columbia.191
Critics of SORNA argue that the negative consequences of SORNA
greatly outweigh its benefits.192 According to critics, registration
183. Id. at 280 (citing Press Release, Nat’l Ctr. for Missing & Exploited Children, Na-
tional Center for Missing and Exploited Children Creates New Unit to Help Find
100,000 Missing Sex Offenders and Calls for States to Do Their Part, at para. 1
(Feb. 28, 2007)).
184. Id. at 281.
185. See SEX OFFENDER GUIDELINES, supra note 79, at 3.
186. OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GEN., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, THE NATIONAL GUIDELINES
FOR SEX OFFENDER REGISTRATION AND NOTIFICATION (2007), https://www.justice.
gov/archive/tribal/docs/fv_tjs/session_3/session3_presentations/Sex_Offender
_Guidelines.pdf [https://perma.unl.edu/D9G8-6HNL].
187. Id.
188. 42 U.S.C. § 16916 (2012).
189. 42 U.S.C. § 16911(2)–(4) (2012).
190. Lori McPherson, SORNA—Basic History and Provisions, 44 PROSECUTOR 24, 24
(2010) (“[SORNA] is designed to create a seamless system of sex offender regis-
tration and notification across the country.”); see also Matthew S. Miner, The
Adam Walsh Act’s Sex Offender Registration and Notification Requirements and
the Commerce Clause: A Defense of Congress’s Power to Check the Interstate Move-
ment of Unregistered Sex Offenders, 56 VILL. L. REV. 51, 64 (2011) (“By the time
the Adam Walsh Act was nearing passage in the Senate one year later, the two
lead Senate sponsors of the Act cited a[ ] . . . large[ ] number—150,000—of
known, but unregistered sex offenders who had fallen through gaps in the state-
by-state registry system. In sum, when Congress enacted the SORNA provisions
of the Adam Walsh Act, it was clear a federal solution was needed.”).
191. SEX OFFENDER GUIDELINES, supra note 79, at 3.
192. See, e.g., Brittany Enniss, Quickly Assuaging Public Fear: How the Well-Intended
Adam Walsh Act Led to Unintended Consequences, 2008 UTAH L. REV. 697, 717.
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makes the registrants vulnerable to harassment, general alienation,
ostracization, difficulty integrating in the community, community and
law enforcement surveillance, lack of employment, isolation, target-
ing, profiling, and possible violence.193 These critics argue that those
who have served their sentence in prison or are on probation deserve
to live in peace, so long as they abide by the law, and believe that
placing offenders on a publicly accessible national registry is abusive
and overreaching, and constitutes indefinite punishment far beyond
the original sentence.194
In response to SORNA’s critics, it is worth noting that the purpose
of SORNA and national sex-offender registration is primarily to pro-
vide increased public safety, particularly by informing the community
of the presence of individuals who may be inclined to recidivate.195
SORNA creates a registry that assists law enforcement in tracking the
whereabouts of sex offenders who may be implicated in other sexually
abusive crimes.196 Furthermore, it does in fact serve a somewhat pu-
nitive purpose by revoking the individual’s privacy rights following
the commission of a sex crime and subjecting that person to public
shaming.197 Critics may dissent; however, SORNA established a
greatly needed uniformity between state and federal sex offender re-
gistries, particularly where Congress found that many convicted sex
But see John G. Malcolm, The Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act: A
Sensible and Workable Law that Helps Keep Us Safe, 13 ENGAGE: J. FEDERALIST
SOC’Y PRAC. GROUPS 53 (2012).
193. No Easy Answers: Sex Offender Laws in the U.S., HUM. RTS. WATCH (Sept. 11,
2007), https://www.hrw.org/report/2007/09/11/no-easy-answers/sex-offender-
laws-us [https://perma.unl.edu/U7ND-FS9L].
194. See Roger N. Lancaster, Panic Leads to Bad Policy on Sex Offenders, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 20, 2013, https://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2013/02/20/too-many-re
strictions-on-sex-offenders-or-too-few/panic-leads-to-bad-policy-on-sex-offenders
[https://perma.unl.edu/BTN8-6ML6]; No Easy Answers: Sex Offender Laws in the
U.S., supra note 193. The nature of sex crimes, issues with underreporting of
sexual offenses, and variation in the methods used by researchers to calculate
rates of recidivism make reliable statistics on this issue difficult to determine. In
one study of 9691 male sex offenders released from prison in fifteen different
states, researchers found a recidivism rate for sex crimes of 5.3% in the three
years following release. Violent crimes were committed by 17.1%, and 43% over-
all were arrested for another nonsexual crime. Almost four in ten (38.6%) of the
participants returned to prison within those three years because of the commis-
sion of a new crime or for violating release conditions. ROGER PRZYBYLSKI, NAT’L
CRIMINAL JUSTICE ASS’N, RECIDIVISM OF ADULT SEXUAL OFFENDERS (2015), http://
www.Smart.gov/pdfs/RecidivismofAdultSexualOffenders.pdf [https://perma.unl.
edu/2N5Z-GTRL].
195. See SEX OFFENDER GUIDELINES, supra note 79, at 3.
196. Id.
197. Catherine L. Carpenter & Amy E. Beverlin, The Evolution of Unconstitutionality
in Sex Offender Registration Laws, 63 HASTINGS L.J. 1071, 1109 (2012) (noting
the punitive nature of sex-offender registrations, including public shaming and
banishment undertones).
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offenders exploited lax state laws in order to immunize themselves
from detection by leaving the state in which they were originally regis-
tered.198 Critics of SORNA have no satisfactory response for how the
former system of state registry laws was adequate or why the exis-
tence of such major loopholes was justified or acceptable.199
Mixed data surrounds the impact of registries on recidivism. Some
studies suggest that federal registration requirements are limited in
their effectiveness in reducing recidivism, while others conclude that
the federal system of registration does reduce rates of recidivism.200
Regardless, some studies demonstrate that national sex-offender re-
gistration enables law enforcement to monitor, and in some cases ap-
prehend, sex offenders.201
Along with mixed data about the effectiveness of SORNA in reduc-
ing recidivism rates, the evidence that SORNA serves as a deterrent is
also mixed. SORNA is fraught with complications. The goal of sex of-
fender laws, both on the state and federal level, was to focus society’s
attention on offenders who were most likely to reoffend.202 However,
many of these laws, including SORNA, reflect an inadequate compre-
hension of the prevailing dynamics of sexually offensive conduct. For
instance, SORNA did not adequately recognize the context in which
most sex offenses occur.203 Sex-offender-registration laws are over-
whelmingly based on the demonization of the sex offender as a stran-
ger although incest and familial sexual offenses are the most common
forms of sexual transgressions.204
Because sex offender laws do not fully apprehend where sex of-
fenses are prevalent, such as between family members or acquaint-
ances, such laws were predicated on the “stranger in the bushes”
profile. Skewed empirical data that used “risk determinative” instru-
198. Malcom, supra note 192, at 55.
199. Id.
200. Id. Studies do not typically differentiate among classes of sex offenders to deter-
mine whether one class is more likely to offend than another when analyzing
recidivism rates. Overall, while recidivism rates are generally low on a short-
term basis, on a long-term basis of fifteen or more years, most studies demon-
strate that 25% to 30% of offenders become recidivists. For example, one study of
approximately 43,000 sex offenders who were placed either on probation (23%) or
supervised release following prison (77%) in 2005 found that 35% of the sex of-
fenders studied were arrested again within three years, and 43% were arrested
again within five years. JOSHUA A. MARKMAN ET. AL., BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATIS-
TICS, RECIDIVISM OF OFFENDERS PLACED ON FEDERAL COMMUNITY SUPERVISION IN
2005: PATTERNS FROM 2005 TO 2010 (2016), http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/
ropfcs05p0510.pdf [https://perma.unl.edu/5PQ8-MP6R].
201. Malcom, supra note 192, at 55.
202. Heather Ellis Cucolo & Michael L. Perlin, Preventing Sex Offender Recidivism
Through Therapeutic Jurisprudence Approaches and Specialized Community In-
tegration, 22 TEMP. POL. & C.R.L. REV. 1, 7 (2012).
203. Id.
204. Id. at 7–8.
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ments and unreliable methods to gather data supported this pro-
file.205 The studies and statistics regarding risk of offender recidivism
thus yielded inaccurate results when applied to individual offenders
evaluated for the likelihood of recidivism.206 Researchers needed dif-
ferent methodologies that accounted for situational context, specifi-
cally the relationship between perpetrator and victim.207 Overall,
studies regarding the risk of offender recidivism yield different and
often inaccurate results for a variety of reasons, especially where the
current statutory scheme of sex-offender-registration laws remains
highly contested.208 Despite the mixed data, it is nearly indisputable
that sex offender laws reduce recidivism by keeping some offenders
incarcerated, either indefinitely or temporarily.209 A sex offender has
no opportunity to offend in the community while in prison, in contrast
with their presence in the community, which could lead to re-
offenses.210
However, in spite of the belief that most individuals convicted of
sex crimes are bound to reoffend, some empirical research suggests
that only a small number actually do recidivate. One meta-analysis of
seventy-three studies found a sexual offense recidivism rate of 13.7%
after five to six years.211 Another study that took into account mental
health issues among sex offenders examined the recidivism rates of
135 offenders who were recommended for civil commitment to a
mental health institution and found that twenty-three percent were
convicted of another felonious sex crime.212
A number of factors make it difficult to capture whether sex-of-
fender-registration laws actually deter and reduce recidivism. Studies
typically base documented recidivism rates on officially recorded infor-
mation, including arrests or criminal convictions.213 However, this
methodology can dilute the measure of the registry’s effectiveness be-
cause this type of methodology results in statistics that only reflect
offenses that resulted in charges or convictions, as opposed to the
number of unreported sex offenses or transgressions that remain un-
reported and unindicted.214 Only one in four people typically report
205. Id. at 8.
206. Id. at 8–9.
207. Id. at 9–10.
208. Id. at 9.
209. Cynthia Calkins et.al., Sexual Violence Legislation: A Review of Case Law and
Empirical Research, 20 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 443, 449 (2014).
210. Id.
211. Id.
212. Id.
213. Roger Przybylski, Chapter 5: Adult Sex Offender Recidivism, SEX OFFENDER
MGMT. & PLAN. INITIATIVE, http://www.smart.gov/SOMAPI/sec1/ch5_recidivism
.html#_ednref6 [https://perma.unl.edu/NE94-HEJJ].
214. Id. In 2009 and 2010, only about thirty-two percent of sex crimes were reported to
the police. MICHAEL PLANTY & LYNN LANGTON, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS,
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sexual assault to the police.215 Given those statistics, it is likely that
the number of individuals who would qualify as sex offenders is higher
than studies suggest.216
Empirical results also vary depending on the length of time be-
tween the date of the offense and the follow-up period; the individual’s
status as a prisoner, parolee, probationer, or person under supervised
release; and the methods used by the individual study.217 Addition-
ally, these statistics generally only address broad categories of sexual
offenses, such as rape, child molestation, and exhibitionism, rather
than categories that would include sex trafficking or obstruction of
sex-trafficking prosecutions.218 The latter category appears to have
played a minimal role in the impetus behind the creation of SORNA
and sex-offender-registration laws generally.219
b. Sex Trafficking as an Offense Under SORNA
As part of the Adam Walsh Act of 2006, SORNA made sex traffick-
ing and attempted sex trafficking of minors or recidivist sex traffick-
ing tier II crimes.220 Tier II offenders must keep their information
updated on the sex offender registry for twenty-five years.221 The
Children’s Safety Act of 2005, a precursor to the Adam Walsh Act of
2006, recognized the need for statutes that protect children to man-
date comprehensive sex-offender registration, including the registra-
tion of sex traffickers under § 1591.222 In the mid-2000s, a number of
highly publicized cases incentivized Congress to focus increased atten-
tion on sexual crimes against children.223 Congress found that the
FEMALE VICTIMS OF SEXUAL VIOLENCE, 1994–2010, at 6 (2013), https://www.bjs
.gov/content/pub/pdf/fvsv9410.pdf [https://perma.unl.edu/7MMH-34HQ].
215. Przybylski, supra note 213.
216. Id.
217. Id.
218. See id.
219. Id.
220. SEX OFFENDER GUIDELINES, supra note 79; see 42 U.S.C. § 16911(3)(A)(i) (2012);
Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-193,
117 Stat. 2875 (2003) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18 and 22
U.S.C).
221. Memorandum from Amy Barons-Evans & Sara E. Noonan to Defenders 9 (Nov.
20, 2006), https://paw.fd.org/pdf/Adam-Walsh-Part02.pdf [https://perma.unl.edu/
AG56-WBHV].
222. H.R. REP. NO. 109-218(I) (2005).
223. Id. at 20 (“Recently, public attention has been focused on several tragic attacks in
which young children have been murdered, kidnapped, and sexually assaulted by
sexual offenders and career criminals, including: (1) the abduction, rape and kill-
ing of 9-year-old Jessica Lunsford who was buried alive in Florida; (2) the slaying
of 13-year-old Sarah Lunde in Florida; (3) the murder of Jetseta Marie Gage by a
sex offender in Iowa; and (4) the kidnapping of Ashta and Dylan Grohne, and
murder of Dylan and their family members in Idaho. These tragic events have
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sexual victimization of children remained underreported.224 At that
time, statistics cited in SORNA’S legislative history noted that one in
five girls and one in ten boys were sexually violated, but less than
thirty-five percent of sex crimes against children were reported to law
enforcement.225 Congress further found that the internet exacerbated
the underreporting problem and directly attributed to the exponential
rise in sexual solicitations of children online, which amounted to one
in seven minors between the ages of seven and ten.226 Congress added
sex trafficking to the list of crimes that require sex-offender registra-
tion in order to protect children and other similarly situated, vulnera-
ble individuals from sexual violence.227 Congress included sex
trafficking as a partner crime to the creation and dissemination of
child pornography, which was, and continued to be, a growing market
in 2005 and 2006 as a result of the burgeoning popularity of the in-
ternet, chat rooms, forums, and other forms of social media.228 Given
the nature of the internet at the time, the relative anonymity afforded
by electronic information exchanges, and the growth in the child-por-
nography industry, individual crimes were developing into commer-
cial operations that implicated child sex trafficking.229
Because Congress understood the ever-expanding threat of sex
trafficking, it enacted SORNA and enlarged the categories of crimes
that qualified for mandatory sex-offender registration. This was par-
ticularly true in cases that involved moving minors across state lines
or adults traveling to engage in commercial sex with minors.230 Addi-
tionally, Congress was becoming increasingly aware of technology and
the internet’s ability to expand child predators’ access to victims and
to proliferate sex and child-pornography exchanges.231 This knowl-
edge, along with an increased awareness of the myriad ways that
predators abuse children, led Congress to broaden federal laws. Be-
cause the transportation of minors both nationally and internationally
underscored the continuing epidemic of violence against children, and the need to
reexamine existing laws intended to protect children . . . .”).
224. Id. at 22. The crime-victims’-rights movement also likely contributed to the in-
creased amount of attention paid to sex-offender registration in the United States
and the focus on protecting victims and marginalized individuals from sexually
violent crimes. See Cook, Stepping into the Gap, supra note 54, at 690–702.
225. H.R. REP. NO. 109-218(I), at 34–35 (2005); see also DAVID FINKELHOR ET AL., U.S.
DEP’T OF JUSTICE, HIGHLIGHTS OF THE YOUTH INTERNET SAFETY SURVEY (2001),
https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/ojjdp/fs200104.pdf [https://perma.unl.edu/YN3B-
B3ZQ] (finding that few of the sexual solicitations, exposures, and harassments of
children on the internet were reported to authorities).
226. H.R. REP. NO. 109-218(I), at 33–34 (2005).
227. See id.
228. Id. at 23 (discussing how the internet has led to an “explosive growth in the trade
of child pornography due to the ease and speed of distribution”).
229. See id.
230. Id. at 23–24.
231. Id. at 23.
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implicated interstate commerce, Congress drew from its Commerce
Clause authority to alter the requirements, mandating registration of
sex offenders of all types, including sex traffickers.232
The concerns of SORNA, therefore, center around sexual conduct,
particularly the protection of children from sexualized violence.233
The text of SORNA itself clearly states its purpose, in relevant part,
as follows: “In order to protect the public from sex offenders and of-
fenders against children, and in response to the vicious attacks by vio-
lent predators against the victims listed below, Congress in this
chapter establishes a comprehensive national system for the registra-
tion of those offenders.”234
Persons engaged in purely obstructionist conduct, therefore, are
beyond the stated purpose of SORNA, which is to protect the public
from sex offenders and offenders targeting children.235 These catego-
ries do not include purely obstructive conduct. SORNA’s legislative
history and its historical context are preoccupied with the recidivism
of sexual offenders, their presence in communities,236 and efforts to
coordinate and make uniform nationwide surveillance.237 These are
laudable goals unrelated to obstructing sex-trafficking prosecutions or
questions involving whether complicity may further sex-trafficking or-
ganizations and activity. Given the criticisms of SORNA, obstruction-
ist registration may reflect the kind of prosecutorial overzealousness
that undermines the basic preoccupations and goals of SORNA by ex-
posing it to additional layers of already-weighty criticism.
c. The Rule of Lenity
In addition to being at odds with the legislative concerns of both
SORNA and § 1591, obstructionist registration offends the rule of len-
ity. The rule mandates that the courts construe ambiguity in favor of
the defendant.238 According to the rule of lenity, a court cannot inter-
pret a federal criminal statute so as to increase the penalty that it
places on a defendant when such an interpretation can be based on no
232. See id. at 27.
233. 42 U.S.C. § 16901 (2012).
234. Id.
235. Id. (stating that the purpose of SORNA is to create a “comprehensive national
system for the registration of [sex] offenders”).
236. Daniel L. Feldman, The “Scarlet Letter Laws” of the 1990s: A Response to Critics,
60 ALB. L. REV. 1081, 1104–06 (1997) (discussing recidivism and community
safety as common rationales for sex-offender registration laws).
237. Miner, supra note 190, at 63–64.
238. Simpson v. United States, 435 U.S. 6, 14 (1978) (“[A]mbiguity concerning the am-
bit of criminal statutes should be resolved in favor of lenity.” (quoting United
States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 347 (1971); Rewis v. United States, 401 U.S. 808,
812 (1971))). See generally Lawrence M. Solan, Law, Language, and Lenity, 57
WM. & MARY. L. REV. 57 (1998).
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more than a hunch as to what Congress intended.239 Due process re-
quires that a criminal statute “give fair warning of the conduct that it
makes a crime.”240 “[B]efore a man can be punished as a criminal
under the Federal law, his case must be ‘plainly and unmistakably’
within the provisions of some statute.”241 The rule of lenity springs
from this fair-warning requirement. “In criminal prosecutions the rule
of lenity requires that ambiguities in the statute be resolved in the
defendant’s favor.”242 This expedient “ensures fair warning by so
resolving ambiguity in a criminal statute as to apply it only to conduct
clearly covered.”243 Thus, defendants convicted of obstruction and con-
fronted with mandatory registration could possibly argue that the
statutory structure and legislative histories of SORNA and § 1591
bode against obstructionist registration entirely. Additionally, ob-
structionist defendants confronted with registration could argue that
the rule of lenity mandates that the courts construe any ambiguity
regarding the application of SORNA to § 1591(d) in their favor and
eliminate mandatory registration from the judgment.
V. DOCTRINAL AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
Aside from reflecting an overzealousness for criminal prosecution
born out of a hysteria during the War on Drugs and the War on
Crime,244 mandating obstructionist registration may stem from anti-
quated notions of criminality, namely theories involving group and
criminal-enterprise accountability, typified in the rationale behind
conspiracy liability.245 Moreover, mandating obstructionist registra-
tion does not serve any of the justifications for punishment.
239. United States v. Speakman, 330 F.3d 1080, 1083 (8th Cir. 2003) (quoting United
States v. R.L.C., 915 F.2d 320, 325 (8th Cir. 1990)).
240. Bouie v. City of Columbia, 378 U.S. 347, 350–51 (1964).
241. United States v. Plaza Health Labs., Inc., 3 F.3d 643, 649 (2d Cir. 1993) (quoting
United States v. Gradwell, 243 U.S. 476, 485 (1917)).
242. Id.; see also United States v. Velastegui, 199 F.3d 590, 593 (2d Cir. 1999) (“If we
find that the ambit of the criminal statute is ambiguous, the ambiguity should be
resolved in favor of lenity.”).
243. United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259, 266 (1997).
244. ALEXANDER, supra note 3, at 11 (discussing the hysteria of the War on Drugs).
245. See Developments in the Law: Criminal Conspiracy, 72 HARV. L. REV. 922,
923–24 (1959) (“The heart of this rationale lies in the fact—or at least the as-
sumption—that collective action towards an antisocial end involves a greater risk
to society than individual action toward the same end.”).
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A. Theories of Conspiracy: The Inappropriateness of Group
Culpability
Obstructionist registration relies on what may be antiquated no-
tions of criminal responsibility.246 If it is true that Congress intended
to mandate registration for pure obstructionists, such requirements
may reflect what several legal scholars have recognized as archaic un-
derstandings of criminal culpability. As with theories supporting con-
spiracy prosecutions, obstructionist registration reflects a theory of
group culpability that makes defendants liable for the activity of the
entire conspiracy as opposed to merely their own individual responsi-
bility—in for a penny, in for a pound. Advancements in legal scholar-
ship have argued that punishing the defendant for the scope of an
entire conspiracy distorts the actual culpability of the individual.247
For example, some may argue that it works a severe injustice to make
a drug “mule” or courier responsible for the murders of victims of
drug-trafficking conspiracies.
Those critical of charging criminals with the crime of conspiracy
have argued that such a charge is dangerous because it is such a broad
method of finding culpability that a “creative prosecutor might apply
it to activity that should not be made criminal.”248 Comparatively
then, penalizing obstructionists with registration for their associa-
tions is overly broad. Some may argue that such a requirement is also
antiquated. However, conspiracy laws equip prosecutors with the au-
thority to threaten low-level conspirators with prison or other severe
repercussions for failing to cooperate with an investigation and subse-
quently offer sentence reductions in exchange for information about
conspirators or organizational members in the upper echelons of the
criminal hierarchy.249 Some commentators, on the other hand, argue
that the use of conspiracy charges provides prosecutors with much-
needed leverage over low-level conspirators to reveal information
246. See Joshua Dressler, Reassessing the Theoretical Underpinnings of Accomplice
Liability: New Solutions to an Old Problem, 37 HASTINGS L.J. 91, 103 (1985)
(“The common law is wedded to the concept of personal, rather than vicarious,
responsibility for crimes.”); Francis Sayre, Criminal Responsibility for the Acts of
Another, 43 HARV. L. REV. 689, 702 (1930) (stating the “fundamental, intensely
personal, basis of criminal liability” is part of “the most deep-rooted traditions of
criminal law”).
247. See, e.g., Sarah Baumgartel, The Crime of Associating with Criminals: An Argu-
ment for Extending the Reves “Operation or Management” Test to RICO Conspir-
acy, 97 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1 (2006); Alex Kreit, Vicarious Criminal
Liability and the Constitutional Dimensions of Pinkerton, 57 AM. U. L. REV. 585
(2008); Amanda Seals Bersinger, Note, Grossly Disproportional to Whose Offense?
Why the (Mis)application of Constitutional Jurisprudence on Proceeds Forfeiture
Matters, 45 GA. L. REV. 841 (2011).
248. Benjamin E. Rosenberg, Several Problems in Criminal Conspiracy Laws and
Some Proposals for Reform, CRIM. L. BULL., July–Aug. 2007.
249. Id.
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about coconspirators, a means to climb the hierarchy by “flipping”
members of the conspiracy both horizontally and vertically.250
The question that remains, however, is whether the use of conspir-
acy laws on minor criminals, such as those who obstruct sex-traffick-
ing prosecutions, outweighs the cost of imposing serious punitive
consequences on individuals who have not personally participated in
the underlying criminal prosecution upon which their testimony re-
lies.251 On the one hand, it could be argued that complicity furthers
sex trafficking. On the other hand, obstruction alone is not an act in
the furtherance of a conspiracy. Modern approaches to criminal culpa-
bility repudiate conspiratorial approaches and instead make the indi-
vidual criminally responsible only for individual conduct.252 A
frequent misperception that occurs in criminal law is the representa-
tion of a conspiracy as an entity or one single concerted action.253
However, a conspiracy is not fundamentally a cohesive entity wherein
every member is equally culpable.254 Notwithstanding Pinkerton, dif-
ferentiation between levels of criminality amongst individuals in-
volved in a conspiracy is vital.255 After all, people in their individual
capacities commit crimes of various degrees of severity, and the em-
phasis must be on those individual actions, not on the actions of the
group as a whole.256
B. Theories of Punishment
The overzealousness reflected in this particular over-abuse of pen-
alty—namely mandating obstructionist registration—illustrates the
unrestrained and irrational impetus that has made the United States
the most carceral nation in history. The sentences imposed on
criminals in the United States are much more severe than those im-
250. Id.
251. Id.
252. On this point, it is interesting to note:
If Professor Katyal truly wishes to enhance information extraction, there
is a direct way to do it. If a person who is not otherwise deserving of
criminal punishment has valuable information about others’ criminal ac-
tivities, the government need not indict him for conspiracy. . . . If one
wants to use the criminal law to advance the goal of gaining information
about criminal activity, then the statutes that are addressed specifically
to information-gathering—misprision, obstruction, contempt—are the
appropriate ones to use. Their unpopularity and the prospect that “juries
may not convict” is not a reason to abandon them and use instead com-
pletely unrelated law for an unintended purpose.”
Id.
253. Id.
254. Id.
255. Id.
256. Id.
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posed by similarly situated, industrialized nations.257 The United
States imposes sentences on a routine basis that are far greater than
any other Western country, which rarely impose prison sentences of
more than two years.258 In the United States, conversely, the average
prison sentence for felony defendants is five and a half years, with
many prisoners serving much longer sentences than that.259 Over the
last forty years, America’s criminal justice system has been growing at
an alarming rate.260 A “culture of punishment” exists in the United
States, which essentially implies that America’s legal system and its
social customs place a premium on “tough on crime” policies.261 For
example, movements such as the ubiquitous War on Drugs embody
these policies262 and aim to eliminate social ills through harshly puni-
tive laws that disproportionately affect people of color and individuals
living in poverty.263
Broadly, punishment enhances societal harmony and efficiency by
encouraging socially acceptable behavior and discouraging non-nor-
mative, nonconforming conduct.264 Obstructionist registration, how-
ever, serves none of the following theories of punishment: deterrence,
incapacitation, retribution, or rehabilitation.265 There are two types of
deterrence: general and specific.266 Discouraging others from commit-
ting the same crime is the rationale behind general deterrence,
whereas averting an individual from repeating the same crime again
is the rationale behind specific deterrence.267
Mandating registration when the obstructionist is a sex-trafficking
victim does little to satisfy these theories of punishment. In sex-traf-
ficking cases, victims who refuse to cooperate in the prosecution of
their traffickers are often weighing a sliding scale of cost–benefit anal-
257. David Cole, As Freedom Advances: The Paradox of Severity in American Criminal
Justice, 3 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 455 (2001).
258. Id. at 458.
259. Id.
260. Nicole D. Porter, Unfinished Project of Civil Rights in the Era of Mass Incarcera-
tion and the Movement for Black Lives, 6 WAKE FOREST J.L. & POL’Y 1 (2016).
261. Id.
262. ALEXANDER, supra note 3, at 11 (discussing the War on Drugs).
263. See Porter, supra note 260.
264. WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW § 1.5 (2d ed. 2006).
265. Id. Although a more detailed explanation of each theory of punishment is de-
scribed in the body of this section, a brief note on how this paper defines the
aforementioned theories of punishment. Deterrence is a method that aims either
to deter the individual from recidivating or to deter others from committing
crime. Id. Incapacitation aims to remove the criminal from society, thus eliminat-
ing the danger to society that his or her actions caused. Id. The retributive theory
of punishment is used to exact revenge upon the criminal for their actions. Id.
Rehabilitative theories of punishment focus on rehabilitating the criminal and
returning them to society. Id.
266. Id.
267. Id.
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ysis associated with “snitching.” In these equations, the victims con-
sider their fear of threats to their personal wellbeing or the health and
safety of their families with the potential punishment for obstruc-
tion.268 The real fear victims experience often outweighs any deter-
rent effect associated with the punishment for obstruction.269 Turning
to our case study, the threat of prosecution made real through indict-
ment, conviction, and imprisonment did nothing to prompt Farah’s co-
operation.270 Instead, Farah remained steadfast and undaunted in
the face of prosecution and consistently refused to cooperate even
under threat of further prosecution for failure to cooperate in an ongo-
ing investigation.271
Similarly, many victims of sex trafficking, particularly victims
from insular communities like the Somali community of Minneapolis,
Minnesota,272 the home of the vast majority of the victims in the case
study, are largely dependent on their community for a sense of belong-
ing through shared culture, religion, and language. Thus, these vic-
tims may often opt for the threat of punishment rather than face
complete alienation from their communities. Obstructionist registra-
tion, therefore, takes on the form of demagoguery and excessive pun-
ishment is at odds with the congressional purposes of protecting
victims. Similarly, it is an anathema to force obstructionists to regis-
ter as sexual deviants where they have not engaged in any sexual con-
duct. Such punishment in either scenario amounts to overreaching
and abuse, which may prove disastrous to the integrity and sus-
tainability of both § 1591 and SORNA.
Furthermore, the threat of mandating sex-offender registration
would likely fail to deter others from obstruction for many of the same
reasons. Consider again Farah.273 Farah refused to cooperate with in-
vestigators after allegedly facing assault and threats toward his fam-
ily.274 Regardless of the lack of clarity in § 1591(d) regarding the
potential punishment of mandatory sex offender registration, Farah
staunchly refused to testify.275 His continued refusal to testify or help
further the investigation subsequently led to his conviction.276 Thus,
268. A snitch is “a person who tells someone in authority (such as the police or a
teacher) about something wrong that someone has done: someone who snitches.”
Snitch, MERRIAM-WEBSTER LEARNER’S DICTIONARY, http://learnersdictionary.com/
definition/snitch [https://perma.unl.edu/3EGM-UFKN].
269. April Rieger, Note, Missing the Mark: Why the TVPA Fails to Protect Victims in
the United States, 30 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 231, 241 (2007) (citing RICHARD, supra
note 70).
270. United States v. Farah, 766 F.3d 599, 604 (6th Cir. 2014).
271. Id.
272. Shah, supra note 16, at 1B.
273. See supra Case Synopsis.
274. Farah, 766 F.3d at 602.
275. Id. at 602–03.
276. Id. at 603.
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the deterrent capacity of the obstruction provision did not prove useful
and may not in the future for others facing violence because of their
cooperation with police and prosecutors. To the extent that various
communities, including the Somali community, distrusted the efforts
of law enforcement in the first instance, such overreaching would so-
lidify preexisting distrust and create mistrust anew, particularly
spread rampant in an insular community.
None of the other theories of punishment tend to support man-
dated obstructionist registration. Incapacitation involves the incarcer-
ation of a criminal to remove the individual from society;277 however,
obstructionist registration does not physically remove an individual
from society, let alone for remedial purposes. Instead, registration for
obstructionists would achieve the very realities that critics of SORNA
cite, namely an indefinite punishment and alienation for defendants
who have served their sentence.278 Such consequences would provide
much fodder for SORNA critiques, perhaps rightfully so.
Retribution, one of the oldest justifications for punishment, is de-
signed to inflict revenge or pure punishment on the criminal, which
some posit is in exchange for the victim’s suffering—the proverbial eye
for an eye.279 Obstructionist registration, however, lacks proportional-
ity because it bears no resemblance to the offense. This is because de-
fendants who engage in obstructive conduct, but nothing remotely
akin to sexual violence, are forced to present themselves nationally as
sexual deviants. Finally, rehabilitation theories posit that the provi-
sion of education, vocational training, and rehabilitation programs
mitigates recidivism.280 Obstructionist registration for an offense that
did not involve sexual conduct presents no opportunity for rehabilita-
tion, particularly where any rehabilitation offered for sex offenders
would only be useful to a person convicted of a sex crime, not
obstruction.
Moreover, the threat of registration for victims of sex trafficking
who refuse to testify amounts to an unjustifiable layer of victimization
and intrusion in a situation where the victim has already been expo-
nentially traumatized. Such victimization is detrimental both to those
who sex traffickers have already abused and to the integrity of the
evidence in the prosecution.281 As an illustration, some victims may
experience psychological ramifications common among those held in
bondage. Trauma bonding, or trauma-coerced attachment, provides an
277. Andrew D. Leipold, Recidivism, Incapacitation, and Criminal Sentencing Policy,
2006 U. SAINT THOMAS L.J., 536, 539.
278. See generally Malcom, supra note 192.
279. LAFAVE, supra note 264, at § 1.5.
280. See id.
281. See Chitra Raghavan & Kendra Dovchak, Trauma-Coerced Bonding and Victims
of Sex Trafficking: Where Do We Go from Here?, 17 INT’L J. EMERGENCY MENTAL
HEALTH & HUM. RESILIENCE 583, 584 (2015).
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example.282 It is a state wherein victims form strong emotional at-
tachments to an abuser because of a complex dynamic between abu-
sive control tactics, power imbalances, and intermittent punishments
and rewards given by the abuser, a form of Stockholm syndrome.283
These dynamics add to the difficulty of persuading victims to cooper-
ate against their traffickers. Prosecutorial coercion, particularly
through the threat of registration, adds another layer of psychological
force against victims, turning prosecutors into another form of pimp.
Coercing unwilling victims to tell and retell the most embarrassing
intimate details of their sexual histories to sundry strangers, includ-
ing investigators, judges, and jurors, erodes the quality of the testi-
mony and may undermine the integrity of the prosecution before both
juror and judge. Such coercion may solidify psychological damage to
the victim as well as any testimony the victim might render. Further-
more, such coercive tactics provide plenty of fodder for cross-examina-
tion and the rule established by Giglio,284 which arms defense
attorneys with a sound opportunity to undermine the credibility of vic-
tims by informing the jury that their testimony was obtained by force
because they faced threats of prosecution and deportation.285
Hypothetically, and to illustrate the point, obstructionist registra-
tion would be particularly unconscionable in cases involving child vic-
tims who are already vulnerable and highly traumatized. Although
the prosecution frequently relies on the testimony of children, particu-
larly in cases involving child sex trafficking, in some cases law en-
forcement has already alienated these victims by viewing and treating
them as criminals (prostitutes) through the course of the investiga-
tion. This leaves these victims in a conundrum, choosing between hos-
tile law enforcement and abusers upon whom they may still be
psychologically dependent. In addition, law enforcement can detain
children as material witnesses, and prosecutors may request that
child victims who are expected to testify be held against their will un-
til trial via a “courtesy hold,” holding child victims in juvenile deten-
282. Id. at 583 (“Trauma-coerced attachment is hypothesized to be a dynamic, cyclical
state in which victims form a powerful emotional attachment to their abusive
partners.”).
283. Id.
284. See generally Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972) (holding that prosecu-
tors are required to inform jury members if any witnesses are testifying in ex-
change for immunity from prosecution).
285. In Giglio, the Supreme Court held that the prosecution’s failure to inform the
jury of an agreement promising immunity from prosecution in exchange for one
witness’s testimony constituted a failure on behalf of the prosecution to fulfill its
duty to present exculpatory materials to the jury. Id. at 150. Giglio was an exten-
sion of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), which requires the prosecution to
timely disclose any exculpatory material evidence to the defense. Id. at 91.
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tion centers pending trial.286 Consequently, the prosecution has the
discretion and power to escalate the emotional trauma inflicted on mi-
nor sex-trafficking victims well before the child places one foot in the
courtroom—this can occur by coercing their testimony and providing
inadequate support or incentives to testify. Mandating registration for
a sex-trafficking-obstructionist minor would amount to a wholly un-
just abuse of power in an already troubled field of coercion, trauma,
and power dynamics. This provides yet another example of how ob-
structionist registration would serve no justifiable purpose as a
method of punishment because purely obstructionist behavior does
not involve sexual conduct.
VI. JUDICIAL AND LEGISLATIVE INTERVENTION
Human-trafficking crimes, including those punishable under
§ 1591(a), remain the only crimes requiring sex-offender registration
that include their own specific obstruction provision.287 While the ob-
struction of other crimes may be punishable under a general obstruc-
tion statute, only the peonage statute included its own specific
obstruction provisions in statutory language prior to the passage of
the TVPRA of 2008.288 Section 1591 is unique both in that its obstruc-
tion provision is included in the statute and because it can result in a
longer prison sentence or a large fine.289 It does not appear that Con-
gress intended for an obstruction conviction under § 1591(d) to result
in sex-offender registration given the statutory interpretations dis-
cussed supra. Nevertheless, in the interest of exhaustive analysis and
because sex-trafficking cases often embrace a myriad of complexity,
there may exist a set of facts warranting sex-offender registration for
purely obstructive conduct, particularly where the defendant’s con-
duct may not directly rise to the occasion of sex trafficking but may yet
encompass sex-trafficking operations or facilitations.
In its plain language, SORNA mandates sex-offender registration
for individuals convicted of sex-trafficking offenses under § 1591 in its
entirety.290 Unfortunately, SORNA does not clarify whether
mandatory sex-offender registration applies only to sex-trafficking of-
fenses under § 1591(a) or obstruction under § 1591(d) as well.291 Fur-
286. Leslie Klaassen, Breaking the Victimization Cycle: Domestic Minor Trafficking in
Kansas, 52 WASHBURN L.J. 581, 604 (2013) (“Finally, the prosecutor can ask the
court for a material witness warrant, which simply allows the prosecutor to hold
the victim through the trafficker’s trial.”); see Geneva O. Brown, Little Girl Lost:
Las Vegas Metro Police Vice Division and the Use of Material Witness Holds
Against Teenaged Prostitutes, 57 CATH. U. L. REV. 471 (2008).
287. See Sex Offenses Under SORNA, supra note 59.
288. See supra Part III.
289. 18 U.S.C. § 1591 (2012).
290. Sex Offenses Under SORNA, supra note 59.
291. See id.
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thermore, the legislative history of § 1591 does little to clarify the
ambiguities that remain as to whether SORNA mandates registration
where the conviction is only for a violation of § 1591(d). Therefore, tak-
ing into consideration the lack of specificity, and of case law or explan-
atory guidance, the question of whether § 1591(d) may require sex-
offender registration remains an unresolved legal issue. Congress has
not directly spoken to the precise question at issue. No court has ad-
dressed the issue. The anomaly that SORNA creates for pure obstruc-
tionists mandates clarification from Congress; however, in the interim
until Congress acts, one might argue that because Congress has not
directly spoken to the precise question at issue, the courts possess the
ability to clarify the ambiguity. In keeping with the Booker trend to-
ward greater judicial sentencing discretion, the courts are in a privi-
leged position to determine whether a particular obstructionist should
register.292
A. Until Congress Intervenes, the District Courts Are
Perfectly Situated to Make the Registry Decision
After a Sentencing Hearing Where the Issue is
Fully Vetted
In United States v. Booker, the Supreme Court transformed the
federal sentencing guidelines from a mandatory sentencing regime to
a purely advisory one.293 In Booker, the Court orchestrated a
landmark shift in sentencing by liberating judges from the
mandatory-sentencing-guideline shackles and affording them greater
discretion and power to fashion sentences reflective of the principles
underlying 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) on a case-by-case basis, which, accord-
ing to the Court, was more in line with Congress’s intent.294 The
Court was particularly concerned with the plain language of § 3553(a),
which stated that the sentencing court, without the opinion of the
jury, should have discretion to consider “the nature and circumstances
292. Booker involved sentencing guidelines as opposed to statutory sentencing. United
States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 332 (2005). However, the argument here is that
the spirit of Booker or greater sentencing discretion would allow courts to make
case-by-case determinations on obstructionist registration where the court finds
ambiguity. See infra section VI.A (analyzing this argument).
293. Booker, 543 U.S. at 220.
294. Id. at 249. A number of cases following Booker also support the assertion that
case-by-case discretion in sentencing aligns with the congressional intent behind
the Federal Sentencing Act. See, e.g., Peugh v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2072
(2013) (affirming the Court’s intent in Booker to move sentencing in the direction
intended by Congress through avoiding unnecessarily long sentences and provid-
ing flexibility for judges to individualize sentences when needed); Kimbrough v.
United States, 552 U.S. 85 (2007) (extending judicial discretion to crack and
crack-cocaine sentencing guidelines, and holding that the lower court properly
considered the defendant’s history, characteristics, and the nature of the crime in
accordance with Booker).
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of the offense and the history and characteristics of the defendant.”295
The Court further stated that Congress also intended to create a sys-
tem that diminished sentencing disparity and that an advisory sen-
tencing system would enable judges nationwide to base their
sentencing decisions on the underlying circumstances of each individ-
ual case.296 The decision struck down two provisions, one that re-
quired courts to give out sentences that fall within the range of the
federal sentencing guidelines and another that granted all appellate
courts de novo review of departures from the guidelines.297
Following Booker, in Gall v. United States, the Court further delin-
eated the post-Booker sentencing procedure.298 Under Gall, the sen-
tencing court must first determine the correct sentencing range and
then consider the arguments of both parties regarding the appropriate
sentence.299 In reaching the appropriate sentence, the court must con-
sider the § 3553(a) sentencing factors.300 Finally, the court must as-
sess the individual defendant based on the facts presented, including
the presentence report, and determine whether a sentence that falls
outside the guidelines is appropriate.301 If the court does decide that a
deviation from the guidelines is suitable, then it must justify that de-
cision on the record.302 Therefore, after Booker and Gall, a judge may
deviate from the guidelines, but the guidelines “remain firmly en-
trenched in federal sentencing practice.”303
295. Booker, 543 U.S. at 249 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1) (2012)). The factors to be
used in determining a reasonable sentence are as follows:
(1) the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and char-
acteristics of the defendant;
(2) the need for the sentence imposed . . . ;
(3) the kinds of sentences available;
(4) the kinds of sentence and the sentencing range established for [the
category of offense committed];
(5) any pertinent policy statement . . . ;
(6) the need to avoid unwarranted sentence disparities among defend-
ants with similar records who have been found guilty of similar conduct;
and
(7) the need to provide restitution to any victims of the offense.
18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2012).
296. Booker, 543 U.S. at 250; see also Pepper v. United States, 562 U.S. 476, 490
(2011) (“Preliminarily, Congress could not have been clearer in directing that
‘[n]o limitation . . . be placed on the information concerning the background, char-
acter, and conduct’ of a person convicted of an offense which a court of the United
States may . . . consider . . . .” (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3577 (1970))).
297. Booker, 543 U.S. at 259.
298. See Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38 (2007).
299. Id. at 49–50.
300. Id. at 49; see also 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2) (2012) (outlining the factors the judge
must consider).
301. Gall, 552 U.S. at 49.
302. Id. at 50.
303. Zane A. Umsted, Deterring Racial Bias in Criminal Justice Through Sentencing,
100 IOWA L. REV. 431 (2014).
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In the wake of Booker, many commentators and critics predicted
that the abandonment of a mandatory-sentencing regime would in-
crease already-disparate sentences.304 Some argued that implicit bias
304. See, e.g., Robert C. Scott, Booker is the Fix, 24 FED. SENT’G REP. 340 (2012). In
1984, Congress passed the Sentencing Guidelines and Policy Statements of the
Sentencing Reform Act (“SRA”). David B. Mustard, Racial, Ethnic, and Gender
Disparities in Sentencing: Evidence from the U.S. Federal Courts, 44 J.L. & ECON.
285, 285 (2001). The SRA was designed to “eliminate sentencing disparities and
state[s] explicitly that race, gender, ethnicity, and income should not affect the
sentence length.” Id. at 285–86. Since the promulgation of sentencing guidelines,
there has been increased scholarly scrutiny of racial, gender, and social class dis-
parities in criminal sentencing. Id. at 286. In a study promulgated by the U.S.
Sentencing Commission, it was found that mandatory minimums actually
worked against the most important goal of determinate sentencing. U.S. SEN-
TENCING COMM’N, 2011 REPORT TO THE CONGRESS: MANDATORY MINIMUM PENAL-
TIES IN THE FEDERAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 345 (2011) [hereinafter
MANDATORY MINIMUM PENALTIES] (“[C]ertain mandatory minimum provisions ap-
ply too broadly, are set too high, or both, to warrant the prescribed minimum
penalty for the full range of offenders who could be prosecuted under the particu-
lar criminal statute. This has led to inconsistencies in application of certain
mandatory minimum penalties, as shown by the Commission’s data analyses and
confirmed by interviews of prosecutors and defense attorneys who practice in 13
district courts.”). The Commission found that sentence enhancements actually
promoted sentence disparity instead of alleviating it. Id. at 34546 (“These analy-
ses and interviews indicate that different charging and plea practices have devel-
oped in various districts that result in the disparate application of certain
mandatory minimum penalties, particularly those provisions that require sub-
stantial increases in sentence length.”). This is because sentence enhancements
do not eliminate discretion in sentencing; they merely shift the discretion from
the judge to the prosecutor. Marc Mauer, The Impact of Mandatory Minimum
Penalties in Federal Sentencing, 94 JUDICATURE 6, 40 (2010) (“In examining the
effects of mandatory sentencing since the 1950s, sentencing scholar Michael
Tonry concludes that ‘Evaluated in terms of their stated substantive objectives,
mandatory penalties do not work. The record is clear . . . that mandatory penalty
laws shift power from judges to prosecutors . . . .’ ” (emphasis added) (quoting
MICHAEL TONRY, SENTENCING MATTERS (Oxford Univ. Press 1996))). If the prose-
cutor decides to pursue an enhancing factor and proves her case, the mandatory
nature of the sentencing scheme means that the judge is bound to apply the en-
hancement. MANDATORY MINIMUM PENALTIES, supra, at 347 (“The Supreme Court
has stated that ‘[a]s a matter of administration and to secure nationwide consis-
tency, the Guidelines should be the starting point and the initial benchmark’ in
sentencing.” (quoting Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 49 (2007))). But the pros-
ecutor often will not pursue the enhancement, or will only use it as a bargaining
chip in plea bargaining. Id. at 108–09 (discussing the prosecutorial practice of
charge bargaining). More damning, the study also found that sentence disparity
under mandatory enhancement schemes was correlated with the race of the de-
fendant. Sentences of white defendants were more likely to fall below mandatory
minimums than those of black or Hispanic defendants. See generally id. at
101–201. Shawn D. Bushway and Anne Morrison Piehl, in a study of punish-
ments under Maryland’s sentencing guidelines, found that African Americans
had twenty percent longer sentences than whites. Shawn D. Bushway & Anne
Morrison Piehl, Judging Judicial Discretion: Legal Factors and Racial Discrimi-
nation in Sentencing, 35 L. & SOC’Y REV. 733, 733 (2001) (“We find more judicial
discretion and greater racial disparity than is generally found in the literature.”).
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would affect sentencing along race, gender, and class lines, which
prompted sentencing guidelines in the first instance.305 Indeed, the
Sentencing Reform Act found strong sponsorship from liberal mem-
bers of Congress such as Senator Edward Kennedy and a number of
left-leaning interest groups.306 The structured scheme of the federal
sentencing guidelines aimed to reduce racial disparity in sentenc-
ing.307 Remarkably, although the holding in Booker provided judges
with the required discretion, authority, and power to do so, according
to the data, few sentencing judges have departed or varied from the
sentencing guidelines.308 Data from the United States Sentencing
Commission confirms that in 2014, 2.2% of cases nationwide received
sentences above the guideline range.309 In nearly eighty percent of
cases, sentencing courts meted out sentences within or below the
guideline range.310 However, statistics about disparities based on race
Similarly, David B. Mustard found that “blacks, males, and offenders with low
levels of education and income receive substantially longer sentences” than
whites, females, and educated offenders. Mustard, supra, at 285. If the studies
are correct, and if these punishments are meant to send a message, it is, among
other things, a troubling message of racial, gender, and economic inequality. If
punishment expresses condemnation, it says that African Americans and Latinos
are more worthy of condemnation than whites even when their behavior is the
same. Punishment offers an education in morals. As Jean Hampton argues, it
teaches a morality of racial, social, economic, and gender hierarchies. See gener-
ally Jean Hampton, The Moral Education Theory of Punishment, 13 PHIL. & PUB.
AFF. 208 (1984). Of course, some punishments send the opposite message, as
when Martha Stewart was convicted and one of the jurors said that the verdict
“sends a message to bigwigs in corporations. . . . They have to abide by the law.
No one is above the law.” Alex Berenson, Juries Sending Message to Execs,
LEDGER, Mar. 8, 2004, http://www.theledger.com/news/20040308/juries-sending-
message-to-execs [https://perma.unl.edu/9MDU-XL79] (quoting juror Chappell
Hartridge). My point here is not that punishments are always unequal and un-
just. It is simply that in the aggregate, because of the complexity of the messages
that punishments impart, such punishments send messages that most of us
would not endorse. The complexity of punishment’s social messages means that
the messages are less predictable and coherent than we would like.
305. Joshua B. Fischman & Max M. Schanzenbach, Racial Disparities Under the Fed-
eral Sentencing Guidelines: The Role of Judicial Discretion and Mandatory Mini-
mums, 9 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 729, 729 (2012).
306. Id.
307. Id.
308. See Mark W. Bennett, Confronting Cognitive “Anchoring Effect” and “Blind Spot”
Biases in Federal Sentencing: A Modest Solution for Reforming a Fundamental
Law, 104 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 489 (2014).
309. U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, NATIONAL COMPARISON OF SENTENCE IMPOSED AND PO-
SITION RELATIVE TO THE GUIDELINE RANGE (2014), http://www.ussc.gov/sites/de
fault/files/pdf/research-and-publications/annual-reports-and-sourcebooks/2014/
TableN.pdf [https://perma.unl.edu/HH77-XY9H].
310. U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, PRELIMINARY QUARTERLY DATA REPORT tbl.1 (2015),
http://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/research-and-publications/federal-sen
tencing-statistics/quarterly-sentencing-updates/USSC-2015_3rd_Quarterly_Re
port.pdf [https://perma.unl.edu/4X9E-4EEY].
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and other factors vary across the board. Some sources state that the
racial disparity in sentencing between black and white males has
skyrocketed from 4.5% before Booker to 15% following the decision,
although the Department of Justice states that on average, sentences
are 4.9% higher for black defendants as opposed to white defendants
generally.311
Despite the varied data concerning the impact of race, class, and
gender on disparate sentencing post-Booker, the elimination of
mandatory sentencing has enhanced the sentencing court’s ability to
humanize defendants and to contextualize them as individuals.312
Booker and its progeny enabled judges to recognize the particularities
of individual defendants; the idiosyncrasies of various crimes; and the
need to avoid unwarranted disparities and uniformities, or situations
where defendants who are not similarly situated are treated the
same.313 In sex-trafficking-obstruction cases, this particularization is
singularly important. Providing for case-by-case determinations al-
lows judges, particularly in § 1591(d) prosecutions, to differentiate be-
tween defendants and their conduct based upon their actual
commission of a crime, their circumstances, any aggravating or miti-
gating factors, and the appropriateness of a particular sentence for a
given transgression. For example, in a sex-trafficking conspiracy, one
obstructionist may be involved more directly in the act of sex traffick-
ing, while another may be completely uninvolved. Given these two
starkly different situations, mandatory registration would work an
anathema. Whatever the ability of implicit bias to impact sentencing,
it may be argued that the liberalization of judicial discretion in sen-
tencing in the wake of Booker has allowed the sentencing court to de-
termine the appropriateness of obstructionist registration in any
given case in the absence of clear Congressional action and interven-
tion, even in cases involving statutorily prescribed punishment. Al-
though Booker and its progeny applied to the guidelines, if a court
found that obstructionist registration presented a statutory ambigu-
ity, and therefore allowed for sentencing discretion, the spirit of
311. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FACT SHEET: THE IMPACT OF UNITED STATES V. BOOKER ON
FEDERAL SENTENCING (2006), https://www.justice.gov/archive/opa/docs/United_
States_v_Booker_Fact_Sheet.pdf [https://perma.unl.edu/3LMJ-7288]; Sonja
Starr, Did Booker Increase Disparity? Why the Evidence is Unpersuasive, 25 FED.
SENT’G REP. 323, 323–26 (2013).
312. Pepper v. United States, 562 U.S. 476, 482 (2011) (“It has been uniform and con-
stant in the federal judicial tradition for the sentencing judge to consider every
convicted person as an individual and every case as a unique study in the human
failings that sometimes mitigate, sometimes magnify, the crime and the punish-
ment to ensue.” (quoting Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81, 113 (1996))).
313. Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38 (2007) (accepting the lower court’s treatment of
coconspirators who were not similarly situated as different from each other).
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Booker further solidifies the court’s authority to make individually tai-
lored sentencing decisions within the scope of § 3553(a).
B. Sex Offender Registry as a Penalty for Obstruction
Under § 1591
In sum, cases involving pure obstructionist behavior, such as that
of United States v. Farah,314 should not warrant sex-offender registra-
tion. When individuals that have no other involvement in sex-traffick-
ing operations except personal knowledge yet obstruct prosecution by
refusing to cooperate, it is an egregious abuse of authority to force
them to register as a sexual deviant on a public, national registry.
This result would be absurd and subject the defendant to unwar-
ranted ridicule, scorn, isolation, harassment, and in some cases, the
threat of danger and assault. SORNA requires the registration of
those who have committed sexual offenses.315 Its guidelines specifi-
cally define a “sex offender” as “an individual who was convicted of a
sex offense.”316 SORNA states that a “sex offense” “has an element
involving a sexual act or sexual contact with another.”317 Although
the obstruction charge would fall under § 1591, obstruction is not a
sexual offense. Both subsections 2246(1) and (3) contemplate sexual
contact and acts that involve the touching of the genitalia, anus, groin,
breast, inner thigh, or buttocks of any person with the intent to abuse,
humiliate, harass, degrade, or arouse or gratify the sexual desire of
any person.318 Pure obstructionist conduct stands outside this
contemplation.
Despite these results, a set of circumstances might exist where a
defendant convicted under § 1591(d) should also be required to regis-
ter as a sex offender even though the government has not charged him
or her with § 1591(a) sex trafficking. It could be argued, for example,
that Farah should be subject to registration. As a member of the So-
mali Outlaws, Farah had knowledge of sex trafficking and may have
been complicit in sex trafficking by refusing to testify or cooperate in
the investigation or prosecution. There is an argument that his refusal
to continue cooperating reflects a certain complicity with the business
and enterprise of the Outlaws. He had engaged in a quid pro quo ex-
change by agreeing to testify in exchange for immunity from prosecu-
314. See generally supra Part II.
315. See SEX OFFENDER GUIDELINES, supra note 79, at 15.
316. Id.
317. 42 U.S.C. § 16911(5)(A)(i) (2012). Unfortunately, however, § 16911(5)(A)(iii) goes
on to include the whole of 18 U.S.C. § 1591 (2012) within the definition of “sex
offense,” which leads back to whether obstructionists convicted under § 1591(d)
must register.
318. 18 U.S.C. § 2246(2)–(3) (2012).
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tion.319 He derived a benefit in exchange for his continued
cooperation; however, after reaping that benefit, he refused to con-
tinue assisting the government. Suppose that his involvement did not
rise to the level of direct sex trafficking under § 1591(a) but that he
received a benefit as a member of the Somali Outlaws from the Out-
laws’ sex-trafficking operations. Such a benefit, for example, may have
hypothetically included access to both women and girls, and the social
cache of having access to “sexual trade” bragging rights. Hypotheti-
cally, he might receive greater access to illicit substances including
drugs or alcohol as a member of the Outlaws, made possible by the
sex-trafficking profits. Arguably, mandated registration in such cir-
cumstances might serve the functions of SORNA by increasing public
safety, discouraging recidivism, and possibly thwarting gang expan-
sion and retention of gang members through public shaming. Moreo-
ver, it could be argued that Farah’s access to victims and the
privileges derived from sex trafficking are forms of culpable sexual
conduct.320
On the other hand, another potential scenario involves former sex-
trafficking victims turned sex traffickers themselves, the so-called
Bottom Bitch or “the girl or woman who has the longest history with
the pimp or who is favored by him,” to recruit other prostitutes or to
exact punishments.321 Consider the paradigmatic example of Wendy
Barnes, a former sex-trafficking victim who did not intervene when
her trafficker continued to traffic other girls after she had attained the
age of majority.322 Ms. Barnes was involved in an abusive and manip-
ulative relationship with a man named Greg who forced her into pros-
titution and used her children as tools of coercion.323 For twelve years,
Greg forced Ms. Barnes into commercial sex. Ms. Barnes was eventu-
319. United States v. Farah, 766 F.3d 599, 602 (6th Cir. 2014).
320. It should be noted that § 1591(a) criminalizes the commercialization of sex of mi-
nors or adults through force or fraud by the exchange of “something of value.” I
will argue in a forthcoming piece that social cache and bragging rights should be
recognized as “something of value” within the meaning of § 1591(a) for several
reasons. First, one refusing to acknowledge social cache, particularly in the con-
text of street gang activity, may inadvertently immunize poorer forms of sex traf-
ficking where gang members may not have access to money and materials for
trading but their social standing within the gang is increased through their traf-
ficking of victims and making victims accessible to other gang members. Second,
a refusal to acknowledge social cache as a form of value within sex trafficking
reflects elitist and classist notions about the way sex trafficking works on the
ground.
321. Butler, Bridge Over Troubled Water, supra note 9, at 1338.
322. Holly Austin Smith, Sex Trafficking: Should All Perpetrators Be Sentenced as Sex
Offenders? HUFFINGTON POST, https://www.huffingtonpost.com/holly-austin-
smith/sex-trafficking-should-all-perpetrators-be-sentenced-as-sex-offenders_b_70
69342.html [https://perma.unl.edu/F5J9-3XMC] (last updated June 16, 2015).
323. Id.
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ally arrested and charged along with Greg.324 She was convicted of
prostituting minors and given a twenty-three month sentence, which
required her to register as a sex offender.325 Ms. Barnes did not chal-
lenge her prison sentence, using it instead as a vehicle to receive coun-
seling and to escape her abuser.326
In the case involving Ms. Barnes, like the sex-trafficking victims in
the case study, it could be argued that requiring her to register as a
sex offender transgresses the purposes of SORNA if in fact she did not
directly engage in sex trafficking. Because Ms. Barnes probably did
not participate in a sexual act or conduct within the meaning of
SORNA, requiring her national registration may actually offend the
purposes of SORNA where she herself is a victim of psychological coer-
cion.327 In the case study of this article, if hypothetically the sex-traf-
ficking victims refused to cooperate and the prosecution elected to
charge them with obstruction, they would have been exposed to regis-
tration. However, allowing the prosecution to make real registration
for those witnesses reluctant to testify, but who did not engage in traf-
ficking, particularly minors, is at odds with both § 1591 and SORNA.
Allowing the courts to make these nuanced determinations is in keep-
ing with the spirit of Booker and its progeny328 until Congress
intervenes.
C. The Consequences of Sex-Offender Registration for Sex-
Trafficking Crimes
Mandatory sex-offender registration is not a sanction to be dis-
counted. As in the case involving Defendant Barnes,329 registration
can have serious, disastrous, deleterious, and long-lasting conse-
quences. Sex offenders are reminded daily of the crime they commit-
ted and are often stigmatized and harassed as a result.330 While sex-
offender registration serves its purpose, it can also result in aliena-
324. Id.
325. Id.
326. Id.
327. WENDY BARNES, AS MY LIFE CONTINUES: SEX TRAFFICKING AND MY JOURNEY TO
FREEDOM 250–57 (2015). The court charged Ms. Barnes with thirteen counts of
promoting prostitution and thirteen counts of compelling prostitution, which re-
quired her to register as a sex offender for life. Id. In spite of the fact that the
judge was made aware that Ms. Barnes had been subjected to psychological
trauma, as well as physical, sexual, and emotional abuse, the court still opined
that her action or lack thereof while under the severe physically and emotionally
coercive control of her abuser warranted a prison sentence and lifetime registra-
tion as a sex offender. Id.
328. See supra section VI.A.
329. BARNES, supra note 327, at 250–57; see supra section VI.B.
330. Erika Davis Frenzel et. al., Understanding Collateral Consequences of Registry
Laws: An Examination of the Perceptions of Sex Offender Registrants, JUST. POL’Y
J., Fall 2014, at 1–2.
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tion; unemployment; failure to secure housing; problems with family,
friends, and intimate partners; and an inability to participate in im-
portant events with children due to the nature of the restrictions on
sex offenders.331
The consequences of sex-offender registration are primarily a re-
sult of social stigmatization.332 Many registrants rightfully fear for
themselves and their families, and are unable to live normal lives
without the constant threat that someone will discover that they are
on the registry.333 These punitive side effects may be warranted in
cases of egregious harm, but when it affects pure obstructionists, a
case-by-case analysis is necessary in order to avoid inflicting unneces-
sary, unreasonable, and overreaching punishments resulting from a
mandatory sex-offender-registration scheme. If extended too broadly
and without coherent reasoning, SORNA will lose its already-belea-
guered integrity. If the courts require registration too cavalierly, the
purposes and goals of SORNA will be severely undermined, providing
ammunition for its opponents. Ultimately, however, congressional
clarification is absolutely necessary.
D. Legislative Intervention Needed
The anomaly Congress created in SORNA mandates legislative
correction. Specifically, Congress should amend SORNA to clarify that
defendants solely convicted under § 1591(d) are not subject to the
mandatory registration scheme. Requiring registration for obstruc-
tionists creates an overly broad statutory application that negatives
the legislative purposes of both SORNA and § 1591(d). Such over-
reaching necessitates clear congressional clarification.
E. Practical Considerations
The threat of registration for obstructionists is an ominous burden
at a minimum. Both prosecutors and defense attorneys must be aware
of this lurking anomaly during the charging decisions, plea negotia-
tions, possible trial outcomes, and sentencing. Defense attorneys, par-
ticularly given their vulnerability to ineffective-assistance-of-counsel
claims, must realize this lurking dilemma. For prosecutors who want
to ensure registration for obstructionist defendants, prosecutors must
weigh the benefits and evidence of charging the obstructionist under a
sex-trafficking conspiracy or RICO,334 or both. If obstructionist de-
fendants are convicted under § 1591(a), whether as conspirators or
331. Id. at 4.
332. Id.
333. Id. at 5.
334. See generally Caldwell, supra note 9 (illustrating the serious concerns regarding
abuse of prosecutorial discretion); supra section VI.C.
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RICO participants, some sentencing courts may find that § 1591(a)
statutorily mandates registration in a clear and unambiguous man-
ner, leaving no room for discretion. During plea negotiations, defense
attorneys should explicitly require clear language in the plea agree-
ment immunizing their obstructionist clients from registration, along
with facts to support the concession and agreement. In particular, de-
fense attorneys should bargain for a dismissal of obstruction charges
under § 1591(d) and instead acquiesce to pleading to obstruction
under 18 U.S.C. § 1503,335 which does not fall within SORNA’s
wingspan.
Defense attorneys should also consider Federal Rule of Criminal
Procedure 11(c)(1)(C) pleas, where the parties can state the explicit
terms of the plea agreement, and those terms are binding on the sen-
tencing court if the court accepts the agreement. Although the govern-
ment cannot put in writing that it will not oppose a statutory
requirement, the defendant will not appeal a Rule 11(c)(1)(C) agree-
ment because he stipulated to its terms. All parties should be aware
that a court may read SORNA, however, to mandate registration as a
nondiscretionary issue that the parties cannot bargain away under
§ 1591(d). As a result, the defendant runs the risk of being subjected
to registration after a plea or a trial unless they proceed in a Rule
11(c)(1)(C) posture. Moreover, the defendant is truly in a catch-22 be-
cause the defendant cannot raise an interlocutory appeal or request
an advisory opinion from the court of appeals. This quandary presents
the need for Congressional intervention squarely.336 In the interim,
defense attorneys would do well to convince the government to dismiss
the § 1591(d) charges in lieu of pleading to § 1503.
VII. CONCLUSION
The brutality of sex trafficking impacts millions of men, women,
and children worldwide. Advances in federal legislation made real in
the Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act (TVPRA) and
the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (SORNA) have
done much to provide tools and resources to judges, prosecutors, law
enforcement officers, and victims to eradicate the trafficking of human
flesh. In spite of these advancements, loopholes still remain in statu-
tory language and in case law that raise questions about the potential
pitfalls that exist in sex-trafficking prosecutions. Discussion of the
overlap between SORNA and the TVPRA, specifically § 1591(d), has
yet to take place in a courtroom or in the halls of Congress.
335. 18 U.S.C. § 1503 (2012).
336. Busic v. United States, 446 U.S. 398, 404 (1980) (“If corrective action is needed, it
is Congress that must provide it.”); TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 186 (1978) (“It is
not for us to speculate, much less act, on whether Congress would have altered its
stance had the specific events of this case been anticipated.”).
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In the absence of congressional intervention, whether an obstruc-
tionist convicted under a sex-trafficking statute should be required to
register as a sex offender requires nuanced evidentiary determina-
tions for which sentencing courts are perfectly suited. In some circum-
stances, it might be sensible; in others it might be unreasonable. In
the absence of case law or legislative guidance, this Article explored
four possibilities: (1) § 1591 obstructionists must be mandated to reg-
ister as sex offenders under the plain language of SORNA; (2) § 1591
obstructionists should not be required to register as sex offenders be-
cause the inclusion of § 1591(d) is either a drafting error at best or
irrational, overcriminalization overzealousness at worst, and is incon-
sistent with congressional intent; (3) judges should be able to exercise
discretion and determine whether obligatory sex-offender registration
is warranted on a case-by-case basis; and (4) Congress must intervene
to correct and make clear its intent. Mandatory and discretionary sex-
offender registration for §1591(d) obstruction have positive and nega-
tive effects. But given the often complicated and convoluted nature of
sex-trafficking prosecutions and the ambiguities that exist in current
legislation, judicial discretion in determining which obstruction
crimes warrant sex-offender registration is of paramount importance
until Congress clearly acts. On this issue, Congress must clearly act.
Corrective action is greatly needed, and it is Congress that must pro-
vide it.
